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OF ARMS AND THE LAW
DAVID T. HARDY*
JOHN STOMPOLY* *

violent crime
during the past decade have led to a demand for measures aimed at
reducing the incidence of illegal violence. Programs ranging from
urban renewal to increases in police manpower have been advanced,'
but no proposal has inspired as much controversy as that of additional
federal controls on the possession of firearms. Proponents and opponents of controls have accused each other of seeking support from
communist-front groups 2 and from organizations of the radical right. 3
6
4
Individual adversaries have been labelled liars, perjurors, racists,
members of the lunatic fringe, 7 and "freaks with advanced psychotic
personality defects."
Arguments have been described as hysterical
propaganda9 and racist assaults on common sense."
The statement
of one Senator that to "consider this question in a rational manner
will be a significant challenge to . . . abilities and objectivity"" seems
likely to prove a clear understatement.
RECENT POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS and a sharp rise in

*
Legislative Counsellor to THE RIFLE, the official publication of the National
Benchrest Shooters Association.
•*
J.D., Rutgers, 1962, Member of the Arizona and New Jersey Bars.
1. See generally THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS,
THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS ch. 17
(1968); NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, To INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY Appendix 1 (1970).

2. Hearing pursuant to S. Res. 35 before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile
Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1967)
(testimony of E. Gomberg) [Hereinafter cited as 1967 Hearings]; Hearings pursuant
to S. Res. 240 before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 682-83 (1968) (testimony of L. Jackson) [Hereinafter cited as 1968 Hearings].

3. See C. BAKAL, THE RIGHT To BEAR ARMS 136 (1966); J. Clark, The Role
of the Federal Government in Combatting Violence in CRIME IN URBAN SOCIETY 89
(B. McLennan ed. 1970).
4. 1967 Hearings874-75 (testimony of J. Tydings).
5. See C. BAKAL, THE RIGHT To BEAR ARMS 200 (1966).
6. See Clark, The Role of the Federal Government in Combatting Violence, in
CRIME IN AMERICA 89 (B. McLennan ed. 1970).
7. See C. BAKAL, THE RIGHT To BEAR ARMS 200 (1966).
8. See Editorial,GUNS AND AMMO, March, 1973, at 6.
9. See 1968 Hearings 201 (statement of H. Glassen).
10. See 1967 Hearings 876 (statement of J. Tydings).
11. Hearings on S. 2507 before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1971) (statement of
R. Hruska) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings].
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This article will examine whether, in view of the extent and nature of criminal homicide,' 2 additional firearm controls at the federal
level are warranted. The constitutionality of such measures will first
be discussed by analysing interpretations given to the second amendment by courts and commentators. The efficacy of existing controls
in restraining homicide rates will be evaluated and a prognosis for the
success of additional federal controls in this area will then be offered.
Finally, the most recent proposals for additional federal firearm regulation will be examined in light of constitutional and practical considerations.
THE CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL FIREARMS LEGISLATION

In the second amendment to the United States Constitution, the
framers enunciated the principle that "[a] well regulated Militia, being
ing necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." The meaning of this
sentence and its impact on federal regulation of firearms possession
is a matter of considerable dispute. With the objective of ascertaining
the proper interpretation of this amendment, this article will first discus existing federal firearm controls and current interpretations of the
second amendment. Then, after articulating the competing interpretations of the second amendment, those interpretations will be evaluated in light of the second amendment's wording, the meaning of the
particular terms employed by the framers and extrinsic evidence as
to the purpose behind the adoption of the second amendment.
CurrentStatus of the Second Amendment
No federal restrictions on the possession or use of firearms existed prior to 1934. Since that date, however, Congress has enacted
three statutes governing not. only the possession and use of firearms
but also their purchase and sale. The National Firearms Act of
193413 was the first of these statutes. Predicated upon the taxing
power of Congress, this statute simply imposed a -transfer tax upon
the sale of certain specialized firearms. 4 Congress again entered the
12. For the purposes of this article, the terms "homicide" and "killing" will be
employed as synonyms for "murder and non-negligent manslaughter".
13. Act of June 26, 1934, ch. 757, § 2, 48 Stat. 1237, as amended 26 U.S.C. §§
5801-72 (1954).
14. A $200 tax is imposed on each transfer of such weapons as fully automatic
firearms, shotguns with barrels of less than eighteen inches, rifles with barrels of less
than sixteen inches, and firearms equipped with silencers. 26 U.S.C. § 5811 (1954).

A $5 transfer tax is imposed on certain other weapons.
(1971).

Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 5845(e)
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arena of firearms legislation in 1938 by passing the Federal Firearms
Act. 1 5 This Act required all dealers in firearms and ammunition to
obtain a federal license, and prohibited interstate shipment of firearms
into the hands of felons, persons under indictment for felonies, and
persons lacking permits where such were required by state law. In
the decades following the 1930's, the demand for further federal con-

trols faded as homicide rates steadily declined.' 6 No additional federal controls were enacted until 1968 when Congress promulgated the
Gun Control Act of 196811 in response to an increase in violent crime.' 8
This Act prohibited the sale, purchase or possession of any firearms
by specified classes of individuals.' 9
The recent origin of federal controls makes it inevitable -that early
decisions of the United States Supreme Court on second amendment
issues would involve state, and not federal, legislation. In the three
early cases which focused on second 'amendment issues, United States
v. Cruikshank,20 Presser v. Illinois," and Miller v. Texas,2 2 the Court
found that the second amendment proscribes only federal and not state
limitations on the keeping and bearing of arms.23 Only in 1939 did
15. Act of June 30, 1938, ch. 850, § 1, 52 Stat. 1250 (repealed 1968).
16. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:

CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN

ADMINISTRAASSESSMENT 20

(1967).
17. Act of Oct. 22, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618 §§ 101-302, (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 901-28) (Supp. 1973). The 1968 Act superseded provisions of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 which had been enacted only four months earlier
and had not yet become effective. See Hearings pursuant to S. Res. 48 before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1969)
(testimony of R. Thrower) [hereinafter cited as 1969
Hearings].

18. See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION
LENCE, To ESTABLISH JUSTICE, To INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY 17 (1970).

OF VIO-

19. The groups under this proscription include convicted felons, persons adjudicated mentally defective or committed to mental institutions, and those who are "unlawful users of or addicted to marihuana or any depressant or stimulant drug.
18 U.S.C. § 922(d), (g), (h) (1970).
20. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
21. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
22. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
23. In Miller, the Court stated that neither the second amendment nor the fourth
amendment applied to the states, Id. at 538, just as the Cruikshank Court had refused
to apply either the first or the second amendment to the states. 92 U.S. at 552. The
continuing refusal of the Court to apply the second amendment to the states is illustrated by Burton v. Sills, 394 U.S. 812 (1969) (mem.), in which the Court dismissed
for want of a substantive federal question an appeal on second amendment grounds
from a state prosecution. Although a detailed discussion of the second amendment's
impact on state firearm controls is beyond the scope of this article, for a discussion
of this issue see Comment, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms; A Necessary Constitutional Guarantee or an Outmoded Provision of the Bill of Rights? 31 ALBANY L. REV.
74, 79-80 (1967).

OF ARMS AND THE LAW

the Court deal with the application of the second amendment to fed
eral legislation. In United States v. Miller,24 the Supreme Court upheld a conviction under the 1934 act for possession of a sawed-off
shotgun. The Court disposed of the second amendment question by
noting:
In the absense of any evidence tending to show that possession
or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches
in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia, we cannot
say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and
bear such a weapon. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that
'this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that
its use could contribute to the common defense. 25
The Court did not state that the weapon in question could have no
connection with a militia, as certain commentators have assumed; 2 6 it
merely found that the petitioner had failed to produce any evidence
of such a connection. This failure is not surprising, however in light
of the petitioner's failure either to appear for argument 7 or to file
a formal brief.2 1 In the three decades that have passed since the decision in United States v. Miller, the Supreme Court has remained silent
on the application of the second amendment to federal firearms regu29
lation.
The lower federal courts have been moderately active in construing the second amendment with reference to federal controls. These
courts have not accepted the rationale of United States v. Millev without comment. The First Circuit, after noting that Miller would permit
the possession of the highly dangerous weapons of modem war, and
that the experience of commando units in the Second World War suggested that almost any weapon was capable of military application, upheld a conviction for illegal use of a pistol on the ground that the defendant had been using the weapon as part of a personal frolic, with
no intent to prepare for a military career.30 The emphasis was thus
24. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
25. Id. at 178.
26. See Comment, Federal Regulation of FirearmsSales, 31 U. CGi. L. REv. 780,
782 (1964).
27. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 175 (1939).
28. The preliminary list of attorneys on brief and on argument makes no reference to appellee's brief. Id. An examination of the microfilm record of briefs filed
discloses only briefs for the government.
29. The Com-t has not, however, remained silent on the application of other pro-

visions of the Bill of Rights to federal firearms controls. See Haynes v. United States,
390 U.S. 85 (1967).
30. Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942) cert. denied 319 U.S.
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shifted from the nature of the weapon to -the manner of its use. The
Third Circuit in United States v. Tot 3 ' upheld a conviction for possession of a pistol following conviction for a felony. Although noting that
the petitioner's claim could be disposed of under Miller because the
defendant had failed to show a reasonable relationship 'between his
possession of the particular weapon and the preservation of a well
regulated militia, the Tot court preferred to rest its decision on the
position that the bearing of arms was not an absolute right, but was
subject to reasonable regulations barring possession by individuals
likely to commit a crime.3 2 The court further noted that the regulation in question did not interfere with the ability of the state to maintain an organized militia.3 3 It thus appears that the prevailing interpretation of the second amendment views the right to bear arms as
limited to matters essential to the preservation of an organized state
militia, either in terms of protecting only possession of weapons suitable for militia use or in terms of protecting only persons discharging
militia-related duties.
The Second Amendment: Individual or Collective Right?
The second amendment's simple statement of a need for a militia
and the existance of a right to bear arms has engendered considerable
controversy among courts and commentators. The major dispute in
its interpretation concerns the question of whether this amendment
creates an individual or a collective right. The United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Miller, as well as a majority of the commentators,34 have adopted the collective rights approach. This position
770 (1943).

The Cases rationale involves construing the Constitution in order to

avoid undesired practical consequences, and may contain an internal inconsistency. The
Cases court criticized the emphasis in United States v. Miller upon the nature of the
weapon on grounds that militia-related weapons might include almost any weapon. The

Cases shift to militia-related activities as the test may not avoid this consequence.

If,

as the Cases court notes, almost any civilian weapon is of military value, then it seems
likely that practice with a civilian weapon will create skills of military value, and
hence the activity may be as militia-related as the weapon. See H. McBRIDE, A RIFLEMAN WENT To WAR 300, 302-03 (1935); 1967 Hearings at 301 (statement of R.
Hru.ska); id. at 313 (report of Joseph Little Corp.).
31. 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942).
32. Id. at 266-67. But cf. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 875
(1960); I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 43 (1965).
33. 131 F.2d at 267.
34. See, e.g., Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American
Experience, 48 CHI-KENT L. REV. 148 (1971); Note, The Right to Bar Arms, 19 S.C.
L. REV. 402 (1967); G. NEWTON & F. ZIMRING, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN
(Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and PrevenLIFE 113 (1969)
tion of Violence) [hereinafter cited as NEWTON & 7_iMRING]; 1968 Hearings 32
(testimony of J. Tydings).
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views the second amendment as a guarantee only of the right of state
governments to maintain organized militia units free from federal disarmament. The effect is to interpret the amendment as stating "the
right of the state to arm organized militia formations shall not be infringed." Under this view, since the amendment protects the interests of the state alone, individuals cannot invoke its protections, and
it confers no right to bear arms aside from uses necessary to the maintenance of the organized state military units. The basis for this interpretation rests upon the view that the amendment's initial clause "[A]
well regulated Militia, being necessary . . . ." strictly limits the following phrase ". . . the right of the people to keep and bear arms
shall not be infringed." It is -argued that the framers used "the people"
to signify "the states," and certain statements of the framers emphasizing the interest of the states in their militia35 tend to validate this.
In contrast to the collective right theory, a minority of commentators have adopted an individual rights approach. 36 This view emphasizes the positive grant contained in the second clause of the amendment that "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not
be infringed." The initial militia clause is viewed as a statement of
the object that the framers hoped to achieve by guaranteeing an individual right to bear arms, the creation of an armed citizenry. By guaranteeing the existance of such an armed citizenry, which would itself
constitute the militia (as the term was employed by the framers) 37 the
framers are seen as intending to create a base, secure against federal
control, from which the states might fashion organized units. Whatever end the framers desired to achieve, the right they created is
viewed by individual-rights theorists 'as residing in individual citizens
and it may be invoked by them as a protection of their right to keep
and bear arms.
In attempting to determine the better view, resort may be had
to both the literal content of the second amendment and to the extrinsic evidence as to the meaning attached to those words by the framers.
35. See authorities cited note 34 supra.
36. See Hays, The Right To Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation,
2 WM. & MARY L. REV. 381 (1960); Levine & Saxe, The Second Amendment: The
Right to Bear Arms, 7 HouSTON L. RFv. 1 (1969).

37. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939,) (militia defined as "all
males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense"); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) ("all citizens capable of bearing arms"). See Atiz.
CONsT. art. 16, § 1 ("The militia of the State of Arizona shall consist of all ablebodied citizens of the State between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years ....
").
See also 4 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 244-

45 (2d ed. 1888) [hereinafter cited as

ELLIOT, DEBATEs].
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An examination of the second amendment should focus upon three
critical phrases: "the right of the people," ",to keep and bear Arms,"

and "[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to a free State".
Some commentators have suggested that the choice of the words

"the right of the people" indicates that the right conferred was collective in nature.18 These authorities argue that the framers employed
the terms "citizens" or "persons" to describe rights intended as individual, and "the people" to describe rights intended as collective. This
argument seems deficient for two reasons. First, it does not correspond
with the interpretation given other constitutional provisions of similar
wording. The fourth amendment refers to the "right of -the people" to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, 9 yet it has been construed as a right invokable by individual citizens.40 The first amendment employs similar language in recognizing the right of association,
a right which though collective in nature, 4 1 has been construed as protective of individuals. 42 The ninth amendment also refers to rights
of the people4 3 'and on the few occasions when it has been applied
it has been viewed as barring government instrusions upon individual
rights.44 In addition to conflicting with interpretations given similar
phrases in other amendments, the view that "the people" connotes
38. See Comment, Constitutional Limitations on Firearms Regulation, 1969 DuKE
L.J. 773, 796-97. But see Levine & Saxe, The Second Amendment: The Right to Bear
Arms, 7 HoUST. L. REV. 1, 18 (1969).
39. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
40. See, e..g, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914). See generally McKay, Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule
and the Right of Privacy, 15 ARIz. L. REV. 327 (1973).
41. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
By definition, no one can associate alone.
42. See Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).
43. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
44. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Justice Goldberg based his
concurrence in part upon the utenumerated rights recognized in the ninth amendment.
ld. at 487, 489-91 (Goldberg, J., concurring). In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
the majority mentioned with approval the district court's use of the ninth amendment
as the basis for its decision, but preferred to rest its own affirmance on the fourteenth
amendment alone. Id. at 153.
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"the states" fails to account for various indications that -the framers
distinguished between these two terms. In the tenth amendment, the
framers reserved non-delegated powers either to the states "or to the
people"4 5 suggesting that they viewed the -two as different entities.
Moreover, major disputes in the ratifying conventions centered upon
whether the phrase "[W].e, the people" in the preamble implied that
the Constitution originated from the people rather than from the
states,4 6 which suggests that the framers did not consider the terms
interchangable. Thus the view that the right "of the people" to bear
arms is really a right "of the states" must involve a dual standard of
constitutional interpretation and also fails to consider evidence of a
distinction made by the framers between these terms.
In contrast, the view that "the people" indicates the recognition
of an individual right does not conflict with interpretations given other
rights off similar wording -and recognizes a distinction between the
people and the states. The terms smployed to describe those to whom
the second amendment rights belong thus seem to support the individual and not the collective approach to the second amendment.
The framers' description of the right "to keep and bear Arms"
also seems more favorable to the individual approach than to the
collective rights view. Two specific rights were established, the right
to keep arms and the right to bear arms. If the framers' intent was
only to protect organized state militias, and insure against a professional army, this dichotomy would be neither necessary nor appropriate.
It would not be necessary, since a right to bear arms in the field would
have sufficed to enable the militia to carry out its duties, regardless
of where the weapons were kept when the members were off-duty.
45. 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST., amend. X. Justice Black, referring to the ninth and tenth amendments,
has stated: "The use of the words, 'the people,' in both these Amendments strongly emphasizes the desire of the Framers to protect individual liberty." Black, supra note 32,

at 871.
46. See 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES 15-16 (statements of Caldwell & McClaine, North
Carolina convention).
See also THE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 63 (M. Borden ed.
1965). The dispute over whether the phrase "We, the People" in the Preamble denoted the people in a collective sense as citizens of the states, or as individuals to

whom the Constitution was directly attributable, formed the basis of the Webster-Haynes
and Webster-Calhoun debates in later years. See 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES 506, 510, 518.
Haynes and Calhoun took the collectivist view. In 1861, certain southern states
elected to appeal the issue by a procedure more frequently used in international law.
In 1865, following protracted litigation, a decision at Appomattox Court House conclusively settled the issue in favor of Webster's individualist interpretation. See B.
CATrON, THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC: A STILLNESS AT APPoMATTox (1953).
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The provision of a right to keep arms is also more appropriate to an
individual than to a collective right. It is possible to construe a right
of the people to bear arms as a collective right to engage in military
service, viewing the bearing of arms as a term of art relating to service in the military. But the keeping of an object is not often used
in other than its most natural meaning, to retain or preserve that
object.17 It is much more difficult to conceptualize a collective right
to keep firearms, residing at once in the entire people and yet in no
individual. The individual rights approach, on the other hand, neither
renders the right to keep arms superfluous nor inappropriate as each
citizen has a right to possess and to utilize firearms. Since an interpretation which gives meaning to all terms is favored over one which
renders some provisions meaningless, 48 it would appear that the individual rights approach is preferable to the collective approach in terms of
giving meaning to the rights recognized in the second -amendment.
The second amendment's initial phrase, "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to -the security of a free State . . . ." has been the
source of considerable dispute. The collective approach views this
phrase as a strict limitation on the right to keep and bear arms which
is conferred in the following phrase, 9 while -the individual rights view
treats it as a statement of purpose, an explanation of the rationale behind
the absolute right to keep and bear arms.5 0 Here, too, the individual
rights approach seems superior to the collective rights stand. First,
as used by -the framers, the term "Militia" referred to all citizens capable of bearing arms, and not merely to those persons enrolled in formal state military units. 5 ' Thus, even should the second amendment
be construed to protect only members of the "Militia" its protections
would extend to all persons capable of bearing arms. To the extent
that "Militia" refers to an armed citizenry rather than formal units,
the collective approach has the same effect in practice as the individual approach. Any citizen physically able to use firearms may do so.
A second difficulty with the collective rights interpretation of this
phrase is that it creates a conflict between constitutional provisions.
Construing the second amendment to bar federal interference with the
armament of formal militia units places that amendment in conflict
with another constitutional provision that creates a federal power to
Cf. 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES 598 (statement of Senator Leigh, U.S. Senate, 1836).
48. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938).
47.

49. See authorities cited note 34 supra.
50. See authorities cited note 36 supra.
51. See authorities cited note 37 supra.
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regulate the armament of formal militia units.5 2 This conflict does
not exist, however, if the individual rights interpretation is adopted.
Under this approach, the second amendment is viewed as creating an
informal militia, an armed citizenry, with which the federal government may not interfere. From this armed citizenry the states might
create formal, organized militia units and these formal military units
would then be subject to federal regulation. Thus, since an interpretation harmonizing constitutional provisions is favored over one that
creates conflict or implies repeal, 55 the individual rights approach
again seems superior to the view that the second amendment creates
only a collective right.
A third reason for the superiority of the individual rights construction of the militia phrase is that this view gives meaning to the
qualifier "well regulated." Under the collective rights view, the right
to bear arms phrase is dependent upon the militia phrase. In effect,
the second amendment is seen as stating that "[t]o the extent necessary -to the existence of a well regulated militia, the right to keep and
bear arms shal not be infringed." This interpretation renders the
qualifier "well" both meaningless and superfluous. It renders this term
meaningless, since it is obvious that prohibiting federal disarmament
of militia units does not ensure that they will be well-regulated as
armament and organization have at best a most tangential relationship.
A guarantee against disarmament may ensure the existence of an armed
militia, but not a well regulated one. The collective interpretation also
renders the term "well regulated" superflous; if the states sought protection of their militias, a simple reference to the necessity of a militia,
whether regulated or unregulated, would have sufficed. The individual rights approach, in contrast, gives meaning to this qualifier and
should therefore be favored. 54 This view construes the militia phrase
52. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 with U.S. CONST. amend. II. This conflict
becomes more prominent if bearing arms is treated as a term of art connoting general
military duties rather than the act of carrying a firearm. The guarantee of the right
to bear arms would, if so construed, prohibit all federal regulation of militia activities,
not merely the regulation of armament.
One commentator has argued that the assertion of control over the organized militia by the federal government has extinguished any second amendment rights possessed
by the states. See Note, The Right to Bar Arms, 19 S.C. L. REV. 402, 409-10 (1967).
The rationale for applying the principles of adverse possession to constitutional guarantees is unclear. It is clear, however, that courts should attempt to reconcile constitutional amendments with the text of the original constitution and that, where there
is unavoidable conflict, the amendment will control. Badger v. Hoidale, 88 F.2d 208
(8th Cir. 1937).
53. Badger v. Hoidale, 88 F.2d 208 (8th Cir. 1937).
54. Cf. Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 587-88 (1938).
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as a statement of the objective which the framers hoped might be accomplished by the creation of a general, individual, right to bear arms.
The right would create an armed citizenry from which the states could
fashion well-regulated units which would form the foundation of their
security and freedom. Taken as an independent statement of fact,
the claim -that a well-regulated militia is necessary to a free state is
not without reason. Taken as a provision of limitation, the statement
that a right to be armed exists only to the extent it is necessary to
a militia which is well-regulated, seems to have little meaning.
Finally, the fourth flaw in the collective rights interpretation of
the militia phrase results from the contention that a statement of purpose together with a pronouncement of a right results in a right strictly
limited to activities having a direct connection with the stated purpose.
This position is inconsistent with the interpretation given a similar constitutional provision, the right of assembly. The first amendment right
of assembly resembles the second amendment both in its pronouncement of a "right of the people" and also in its statement of the purpose for assembly: "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. '55 Despite this structure, the right has been successfully invoked by private organizations as well as individual citizens,5 6 and held
to bar indirect hinderances to assembly as well as direct imposition
of criminal penalties.5 7 Despite the express purpose of permitting
assembly "to petition the Government", courts have applied freedom
of assembly to labor unions whose primary purpose was: economic5 s
and which are barred by statute from most political activities.5 9 Free55. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), a prose-

cution under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Act, the Court refused to apply the right
of assembly where the government failed to allege that the meeting disrupted by defendants had been held to petition the government. Id. at 552-53. This narrow view
of the right of assembly has since been repudiated. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: RIGHTS OF THE PERSON 780-81 (1968).
56. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
57. A denial of access to public employment was found a sufficient infringement
in Gilmore v. James, 274 F. Supp. 75 (N.D. Tex. 1967), affd 389 U.S. 572 (1968).
Disclosure of membership lists was held an invalid infringement in Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 538 (1963)
and in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), invalidated a
requirement that teachers reveal organizations to which they had previously belonged.
The Court in Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. 11 (1966) held unconstitutional on assembly and expression grounds a requirement that state employees take an overly broad
loyalty oath.
58. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1945).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. 1973) prohibits the giving by a union or corporation
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dom of association has also been held to bar limitations on anti-union
pamphleteering by Chambers of Commerce,6 and to limit restrictions
upon political groups not likely to petition the existing government
structure. 6' These decisions are consistent with the principle that constitutional restrictions on government power are to be construed liberally rather than strictly,6 2 but they seem difficult to reconcile with the
collective rights position that a statement of a right is limited by a
statement of purpose. 6" The individual rights approach, in contrast,
would construe the second amendment in a manner consistent with
the construction of the right of association. In both cases the framers
would be seen as recognizing a broad right, not strictly limited by a
purpose clause, and a right which, while it may as a practical matter
be exercised on a collective level,64 nevertheless protects any individual. It appears, therefore, that the choice of the phrase "A well regulated Militia," like the use of "the right of the people" and "to keep
and bear Arms," lends greater support to an individual rights interpretation of the second amendment than to the collective rights approach.
Beyond analyzing the terms used to structure the second amendment, an examination of the meaning attached to these terms by the
framers provides further insight into whether the second amendment
creates individual or collective rights. The meaning of these terms to
the framers may be gathered from evidence concerning usages of the
terms when the amendment was drafted. In this respect, the wording
chosen by the state conventions which, in ratifying the Constitution
of "any direct or indirect payment . . . or any services, or anything of value" to a
candidate for federal office. See United States v. U.A.W. International Union, 352
U.S. 567 (1957).
60. See NLRB v. American Pearl Button Co., 149 F.2d 311, 318 (8th Cir. 1945).
61. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Wallace v. Brewer,
315 F. Supp. 431, 443 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
In those cases where the Court has upheld
limitations on active membership in subversive groups, it has done so on the basis of
a balancing of first amendment interests against societal interests, and not on the ground
that the failure of the organization in question to petition the government for a redress
of grievances left it beyond the protection of the first amendment. See Communist
Party of the U.S.A. v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 97 (1961).
Compare Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), with Konigsberg v. State Bar,
366 U.S. 36 (1961).
62. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32 (1927); Fairbank v. United States,
181 U.S. 283 (1901); cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
63. The position that a statement of purpose, not expressly made a condition to
the operational part of an instrument, limits the operation of the instrument has been
rejected in other contexts. See Damon v. Damon, 90 Mass. 192, 194 (1860).
64. In both cases, the benefit to democracy would accrue only if people in general
took an active interest in petitioning the government or creating an armed citizenry.
In either case, the guarantee of the right to individuals is a prerequisite to its collective
exercise.
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made the original proposals for a Bill of Rights, seems to be strong
evidence of prevailing usages. If these proposals referred -to other
rights which are now accepted as individual in character in terms similar to those employed to express the right to bear arms, then it seems
likely that the phrasing of the second amendment was not seen as
creating a right of a nature distinct from other clearly individual rights.
Proceeding from this premise, a survey of proposals for the Bill of
Rights makes it clear that provisions protecting the right to bear arms
employed language very similar to that used in provisions now accepted as creating individual rights. Ratifying conventions in Virginia,6' 5 New York,66 North Carolina, 67 and Rhode Island6 8 used the
following terms to delineate the rights later embodied in the first
amendment:
[Tihe people have a right to freedom of speech and of writing and publishing their sentiments, that freedom of the -press is
one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be vio,lated.6 9
The Virginia proposal for a right to bear arms,"' which was virtually
identical with those of New York, 71 North Carolina, 72 and Rhode
Island, 7 utilized a similar format:

[TIhe people have a right to keep and to bear arms, that
a well regulated Militia composed of the body of the people trained
to arms is the proper, natural and safe defence of a free State.
The similarity of phrasing suggests that the structure of the second
amendment-a statement of a right of the people, together with a statement of the relation which -thatright bears to freedom and a democratic
government-was not understood at the time of the framing to create
a right different in character from the freedom of speech or of the press.
The meaning of the terms employed by the framers in expressing the right to keep and bear arms may also be clarified by examining
the practical construction given those terms by state constitutions in
existence during the ratification process. Provisions guaranteeing a
65.

DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

ISON 662 (Hunt & Scott ed. 1920).

66. Id. at 667.
67. Id. at 676.
68. Id. at 682-83.
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71.
72.
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right of the people to keep and bear arms were present in the constitutions of Massachusetts,"4 Pennsylvania,7 5 Rhode Island, 76 and North
Carolina. 7 These provisions would be meaningless if it is assumed
that the phrase "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms" refers only to the right of a state to form a militia. A state can hardly
infringe its own rights; a guarantee in its constitution that it will not
do so would border on the absurd. The propriety of protecting the
right embodied in these words against both federal and state interference indicates that it is a right capable of infringement by both levels
of government. Given the structure of the federal system, the process
of elimination indicates that the "right of the people to keep and
bear Arms" must inhere in the individual. 7 Consideration of the
words employed in the second amendment, when viewed in light of
evidence as to the meaning attached to those words when -the amendment was drafted, suggests that the framers intended to create an individual right, and not one protecting the states alone.
Attempts have been made to interpret the second amendment by
an examination of the writings of the more notable framers and their
contemporaries. It is argued that the framers' motive in creating the
second amendment was to prevent the formation of a professional
standing army. Since under this view the motive was to replace the
standing army with the militia, the second amendment should be construed to do more than protect the existence of an organized militia, the modern citizen-soldier organization. 7 This argument appears
to overlook the distinction between motive ,and intent.8S To interpret
74. MASS. CONST., art. xvii (1780); see 3 F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STAE
CONSTITUTIONS 1892 (1909).
75. PA. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 13 (1776); see 5 THORPE, supra note
74, at 3083. See also PA. CONST. art. I, § 21 (1969).
76. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 22 (1776); see 4 THORPE, supra note 74, at 3224.
77. N.C. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 17 (1776); see 5 THORPE, supra note
74 at 2788. Right to bear arms provisions were also adopted in the constitutions of
several states admitted to the union soon after the adoption of the Bill of Rights. See
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 21 (1836); ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1819); 1 THORPE, supra
note 74 at 98, 270.
78. Many state courts have, however, followed the collective rights approach, apparently feeling that the right belongs to some political entity located somewhere between the individual citizen and the government. See generally Comment, The Impact
of State Constitutional Right to Bear Arms Provisions on State Gun Control Legislation, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 185 (1970).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); United States v. Tot,
131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942); Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of
the American Experience, 48 CHI-KENT L. REv. 148 (1971).
80. See People v. Weiss, 252 App. Div. 463, 468, 300 N.Y.S. 249, 255 (1937)
("Motive is the moving power which impels to action for a definite result. Intent is
the purpose to use a particular means to effect such a result."); cf. United States v.
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a constitutional provision in terms not of intent, as gathered from the
document, but in terms of the motive inspiring that intent, as gathered
from the statements: of a few of the drafters, is a most questionable
procedure. This approach becomes a speculative attempt to apply not
the measures the framers had resolved to implement, but instead the
measures the commentator thinks they should have implemented in
light of their goals. 8 ' Whatever the motive, the intent of the framers,
as nearly as can be discerned from statements in the state conventions, 2 the writings of the more noted contemporary authorities, 8 and
the early commentators, 4 was to ensure that the federal government
would have no power to disarm the militia-the body of the citizenry
capable of bearing arms. 5 The motive, whether or not it was to prevent a standing army, should not obscure nor control this intent.
Even should the motive be considered of importance, however,
there is strong support for the view that a primary motive behind the
guarantee of a well-armed citizenry was to enable the populace to arise

Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731-32 (1931) ("[W]here the intention is clear there is no
room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition."); Nardone v.
United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Hotz v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 224 Iowa
552, 276 N.W. 413 (1937). But see Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); cf. Vitty
v. Eley, 51 App. Div. 44, 64 N.Y.S. 397 (1900).
81. This risk is illustrated by United States v. Tot, 131 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1942).
There the court based its conclusion that the second amendment creates a collective
right which does not prevent federal authorities from outlawing possession of certain
arms on citations from Lenior in the North Carolina convention and from James Madison. Id. at 266. Yet Lenior, in the passage cited, objects to the proposed constitution
on the ground that "[wfhen we consider the great powers of Congress, there is great
cause of alarm. They can disarm the militia. If they were armed, they would be a
resource against great oppressions." 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES 203. Since "Militia" connotes
the citizenry capable of bearing arms, as discussed in the text accompanying note 51
supra, this passage suggests that the framers' desire was specifically to prevent the action
upheld in Tot. Madison, in the passage cited by the court, noted that "the advantage.
of being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost every other
nation," together with the federal structure of our government, "forms a barrier against
the enterprises of ambition .... ." Madison then went on to state that:
Notwithstanding the military establishments in the several kingdoms of
Europe, which are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust people with arms.
THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 321-22 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). The thrust of Madison's argument appears to be toward the maintenance of an armed citizenry as a protection
against possible tyranny. This cannot easily be reconciled with a view that, since
Madison used the term "militia" in referring to the citizenry, he would have no objection to federal disarmament of the citizenry.
82. See 1 ELLIOT, DEBATES 371-72 (Luther Martin); 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES 203
(Lenior). See generally Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, A Study in ludicial Misinterpretation,2 WM. & MARY L. Ruv. 381, 392-94 (1960).
83. See THa FEDERALIST No. 46 (J. Madison).
84. See 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTITUTIoN 677-78 (1858).
85. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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in armed rebellion should the newly-formed government prove oppressive. 8" This motive would be inconsistent with any construction of
the second amendment which would allow federal disarmament of the
general population. There is also evidence that right to bear arms
proposals were not viewed at the time of -the framing of the amend-

ment as being aimed at the prevention of standing armies. Alexander
Hamilton in a contribution to The Federalist noted concerning the
state constitutions that "two only of them contained an interdiction of

standing armies in time of peace; that the other eleven had either observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express -terms adAt
mitted the right of the legislature to authorize -their existence."8

the time of Hamilton's statement, four states possessed constitutional
right to bear arms guarantees.88 This can hardly be considered a
"profound silence" unless the right to bear arms provisions were
considered to have no necessary connection with the standing army
limitations. Additional evidence supporting a motive to create an individual right to bear arms is found in proposals for a Bill of Rights
made by several state ratification conventions. New Hampshire
proposed that "Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such
as are or have been in Actual Rebellion." ' 9 Members of the Pennsylvania convention proposed a bill of rights which failed to gain
majority approval but inspired and greatly influenced suggestions for
amendments made by other states. 90 The Pennsylvania proposals ineluded a provision that "no law shall be enacted for disarming the
people except for crimes committed or in a case of real danger of pub86. The necessity of an armed rebellion, should the fears of the anti-federalists
prove correct, was often cited in the state conventions and in other contemporary
sources as a rationale for the maintenance of an armed citizenry. See 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES 203 (Lenior); 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 678 (1858).
Cf. 1 ELLIOT, DEBATES 382 (Luther Martin). Virginia and North Carolina had proposed as a constitutional amendment the statement that
the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787,

AS REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON

660,

676 (Hunt & Scott ed. 1920). The framers apparently recognized as an ultimate political reality that all power grows out of the barrel of a gLm, and proceeded on the
principle that democracies should keep the sources of power in the hands of individual
citizens. It should be remembered that the framers had just completed one of the most
successful armed rebellions in modem history. The prospect of an overthrow of the
government did not worry them so much as the possibility that the government they
were creating might prove tyrannical.
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 153-54 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis in original).
88. See notes 73-76, supra.
89. DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 As REPORTED BY JAMES
MADISON 658 (Hunt & Scott ed. 1920).
90. E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 11 (1957).
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lic injury from individuals .... 91 A motive aimed at creating an
individual right to bear arms is also suggested by the very wording
of the second amendment. That amendment does not prevent or even
limit the use of standing armies. Nor does it establish the militia as
the sole or primary defense of the United States. If the framers meant
to avoid the dangers of standing armies by this amendment, it can only
be observed that they chose a remarkably inefficient way of doing it,
when more direct and positive measures had been proposed.9"
In summary, the framers seem to have intended to create a right
which would protect individual citizens against disarmament by the
federal government. Since this right is an express exception to the
enumerated powers of Congress, it is not limited by any federal "police
power. '"" The individual rights approach has the virtues of consistency
with interpretations given other amendments, avoidance of conflict with
91. Id. at 12. That the right proposed was seen as individual in nature is further
supported by the inclusion of a proposal for a constitutional right to hunt game. ld.
at 13.
92. E.g., the Pennsylvania proposal that "standing armies shall not be kept up in
time of peace, and the military shall be subordinate to the civil power" or the New
Hampshire suggestion that "no standing Army shall be Kept up in time of Peace unless
with the consent of three fourths of the Members of each branch of Congress .... "
E. DUMBAULD, supra note 90, at 12; DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note
89, at 658.
93. See Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 629 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), where the
court stated that:
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan marks the emergence in clarity of the view
• . . that the people, not the government, possess the sovereignty, and that
by the First Amendment they emphasized the withholding from the federal
government of the power to make laws affecting (in Sullivan) the freedom
of the press . . . . (citations omitted).
See also Black, supra note 32, at 867; McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819); THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (J. Madison). Those of the framers who opposed the Bill of Rights often did so on the ground that its protections were
unnecessary, since the federal government possessed only the enumerated powers and
none of those included the power to abridge any of the rights sought to be guaranteed.
The framers who supported the Bill of Rights argued that the protections should be
inserted as a special guarantee of those rights, and to ensure that the general powers
would never be construed to permit the infringement of the rights so emphasized. See
J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 640 (Koch ed.
1966); F. McDONALD & E. McDONALD, CONFEDERATION AND CONSTITUTION 1781-1789,
190 (1968). Neither the view of the proponents nor of the opponents of the Bill of
Rights is consistent with the position that the national government could, under a
manner of police power, limit the rights set forth in the amendments. The Viriginia
resolutions expressly rejected any such approach:
[N]o right of any denomination can be cancelled, abridged, restrained or
modified, by the Congress . . . by the President, or any department or officer
of the United States ....
I. BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 41 (1965). For a government of limited powers to assume power on the basis that such power is beneficial to
the public would resemble a court of limited jurisdiction determining a question beyond
its jurisdiction on the justification that the cause of action was compelling.
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other provisions, and appears to be in accord with the intent of the
framers of the amendment.

THE

ADVISABILITY OF ADDITIONAL FIREARM LEGISLATION

The generic term "firearm controls" includes a multitude of different proposals, ranging in complexity and strictness from simple registration unaccompanied by restrictions on purchase to restrictive permit systems severely limiting firearm ownership. It is impossible to
examine in depth all possible forms of firearm restrictions within the
limits of this article. Emphasis will therefore be placed on the development of concepts having a general application to the more frequently proposed forms of firearm controls, with limited discussions
of particular features of certain control proposals. The advisability of
controls will be evaluated by exploring two issues; first, whether there
is reason to believe that controls currently in existence have acted to
reduce homicide rates and, second, whether it appears likely that additional federal controls would prove capable of reducing future levels
of homicide.
Existing Controls And Homicide Rates
Comparisons of homicide rates prevailing in areas with and
without firearm controls are frequently employed in attempts to ascertain whether existing controls have lowered homicide rates. Far
too many comparisons have been made to be dealt with individually.
Instead, this article will initially analyze the three major shortcomings
often found in these simple comparisons: a failure to utilize the relevant criterion; a failure to demonstrate that relations between homicide rates and controls is causal in nature; and a failure to show a
uniform relation between controls and lower homicide rates. Recent
statistical studies will then be examined in order to determine to what
degree statistical tools can improve upon the simple comparison.
Simple Comparisons
Studies which employ the percentage of homicides committed
with firearms as a basis for comparing control and non-control areas'"
utilize a criterion which has no relevance to the -proper objective of
controls. The proper basis for assessing the effectiveness of controls
94. See, e.g., C. BAKAL, THE RIGHT To BEAR ARMS 270 (1966); R. CLARK, CRIMM
104 (1970); 1967 Hearings, supra note 2, at 873 (statement of I.
Tydings); 1971 Hearings, supra note 11, at 377-78 (statement of B. Bayh).
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is the overall homicide rate. A lower percentage use of firearms in
areas with controls does not prove that controls thwart homicides.
The difference may result from the use of other weapons, such as
knives, 95 the use of which may be necessitated by controls or brought
about by cultural influences. 96 The lack of a consistent relationship
between the percentage of firearms used in homicide and the overall
homicide rates9 7 suggests that lower percentages of firearm homicides
do not reflect frustrated gun homicides, but instead successful nongun homicides. It would therefore appear that comparisons based
upon the percentages of firearms used in homicides are based upon

a standard which has no relevancy to the desirability of firearm controls.

A second flaw present in most comparisons consists of a failure
to demonstrate that the variations observed in homicide rates are due
to the presence or absence of firearm controls. These comparisons

frequently fail to account for many of the factors influencing homicide
rates9" and often display serious cultural and economic biases.

Three

95. See notes 221-223 and accompanying text, infra.
96. The effect of factors other than controls on the choice of weapons in homicide can be illustrated by a few examples. In New York in 1966 the percentage of rifles
and shotguns was half the nationwide rate, yet that state imposed no controls on such
long weapons at that time. Benenson, A Controlled Look at Gun Controls, 14
N.Y.L.F. 718, 734 (1968). England's low percentage of gun use in homicides has been
ascribed to that nation's strict gun controls. See R. CLARK, supra note 94, at 105. England does not control knife ownership, however, and yet only 5% of English homicides involve knives, a rate less than one-third the American rate.
Compare N.
WALKER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BRITAIN 20 (Edinburgh University Press 1968),
with FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1968 at 108 [hereinafter cited as UCR]. During the 1967 hearings, when questioned concerning states
without controls which had lower percentages of gun homicides than certain controlling
states, Ramsey Clark stated: "I think you are comparing unlikes . . . . You have to
compare the conduct of people and the methods of reporting . . . . The statistical
quality varies tremendously with different jurisdictions." 1967 Hearings 945. Clark
is, however, fond of citing favorable comparisons of this type as proof of the desirability of controls. See R. CLARK, supra note 94, at 104.
97. See chart I, infra, at note 177 and accompanying text. See also M. WOLFGANG, PATrERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 81-82 (1958). Wolfgang found that while homicide rates in Philadelphia were approximately equal to overall Pennsylvania rates, firearms were used in 33% of Philadelphia murders, compared to 68% statewide. Much
the same difficulty is found in comparisons based on the number of firearm killings,
rather than overall homicide rates. For example, Clark cites Japan as having but 68
gun suicides in 1968, compared to 10,407 in the U.S. R. CLARK, supra note 94, at
103. The overall suicide rate for Japan in that year was, however, approximately
50% higher than the U.S. rate. National Commission on the Causes and Prevention
of Violence, InternationalComparisons, in THE CRIMINAL IN SocIrETY 230 (1971).
98.

See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES

AND PREVENTION

OF VIOLENCE,

supra note 1, at 24-32. Comparisons intended to demonstrate control ineffectiveness
were criticized during Senate hearings by Senators Dodd and Tydings for failure to account for factors ranging from population density to social considerations. The senators
concluded that "unless states are compared in a highly controlled manner with respect
to each and every one of these and perhaps other crime factors, no meaningful esti-
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recent comparisons made by Ramsey Clark, 9 The New York
Times,'0 0 and a Harvard Law Review commentary10 ' are typical.

These comparisons refer to a total of four control states-New York,
Massachusetts, New Jersey and Rhode Island-and a total of five noncontrol states-Florida, Texas, Arizona, Georgia and Mississippi. A
regional bias is immediately evident; every state chosen to represent
control states is located in the Northeast, while all states chosen to
represent non-controlling states are in the Southeast or Southwest.
The effect is to introduce a strong cultural bias in that societal factors
incline the Southeast and Southwest to a higher homicide rate than
prevails in the Northeast. 10 2 An economic bias is also present. The
states chosen to represent control areas have much higher per-capita
incomes than those picked to represent areas without controls. 1 3 In
view of the strong positive relationship between poverty and levels of
violent crime, 10 4 this economic bias has a significant effect on the

validity of these comparisons. The neutrality of the comparisons, thus
is compromised by cultural and economic biases. To the extent that
mate can be made of the net effect of any firearms licensing law ....
." 1968 Hearings 555. Despite this valid criticism of simple comparisons, both senators employed
such comparisons extensively to support their positions during the hearings. See 1968
Hearings 21, 49, 514. See also R. CLARK, supra note 94, at 104-105:
While our information is far from complete and comparisons fail to account
for such differences as urbanization, industrialization, economic status, climate, ethnic composition and regional history that affect murder rates, it is
perfectly clear that lots of guns and little control mean murder.
99. R. CLARK,supra note 94, at 104.
100. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1968, § 1 at 38.
101. Note, Firearms: Problems of Controls, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1328, 1345 (1967).
102. A. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 140 (6th ed.
1970); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 31; Pettigrew & Spier, The Ecological
Structure of Negro Homicide in CRIME IN AMERICA 69 (B. Cohen ed. 1970). Similar
cultural biases occur in attempts to compare U.S. homicide rates with those of other
nations. See NEWTON & ZIMRING 124; 1968 Hearings 204-05 (statement of H.
Glassen).
103. The following table illustrates this:
State
per capita income
rank
New York
$4,797
2
New Jersey
$4,539
5
Massachusetts
$4,294
9
Rhode Island
$3,920
15
Arizona
$3,542
29
Texas
$3,515
30
Georgia
$3,277
34
Mississippi
$2,561
50
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1971, 314.
Comparisons
which weigh crime rates in the second most wealthy state in the nation against those
in the least wealthy state cannot be considered neutral with regard to economic status.
104. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF
VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 24-25; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 1, at 134; R. CLARK, supra note 94, at 50.
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these factors may account for the rate variations observed, no causal
relationship between controls and lower homicide rates is established.
Another reason why variations in homicide rates cannot prove
that controls cause homicide rate reductions lies in the possibility of
common causation. The "frontier ethic" present in the South and
West tends to promote higher homicide rates in those regions."'0
That same cultural factor tends to create an aversion to firearm controls in those areas.1" 6 Thus it is possible that states without controls
would tend to have higher homicide rates, not because the absence
of controls results in higher rates, but because both the absence of
controls and the higher rates result from -the same cultural factors. 10 7
An externally imposed change in firearms regulations would not necessarily reduce homicide rates in noncontrolling areas if this analysis is
correct, since the real determinant of the higher rates would remain
unaffected. Thus, even if controls and lower rates often coincide, the
coincidence does not prove a causal link between the two, for both
may 'be effects of a common cultural cause.
A third weakness frequently found in simple comparison studies
consists of evidence suggesting that controls are not the only, nor even
the major, determinant of the homicide rate. Pennsylvania, New
Jersey and Hawaii are often mentioned as examples of controlling
states with homicide rates well below the national average, the inference being that controls have lowered their rates relative to nationwide
levels.10 8 Pennsylvania's law was adopted in 1939.109 An examination of 1938 homicide figures reveals that the Pennsylvania homicide
rate was 3.5 per 100,000 population, well below the 5.3 national average."1 0 The New Jersey controls were imposed in 1966; 1 while its
105. See note 102 supra.
106. See Pettigrew & Spier, supra note 102, at 72. It has been argued that states
with higher homicide rates are more likely to adopt controls. This misstates the proper
premise; states that perceive their homicide rates as being excessive are more likely to

institute firearm regulations. A population with little propensity for violence is more
apt to consider high homicide rates as unnatural, and less likely to regard firearms as
having legitimate uses, and thus is more likely to adopt a system of firearms controls.
107. An analogy may be found in studies which note a strong correlation between

homicide rates and membership in certain religions. It has been argued that a given
religion is itself unlikely to cause high or low murder rates. Instead, it is probable
that certain religions tend to find adherents in regions and social groups with high
murder rates, while others are more often adopted by persons in groups with lower pro-

clivities to violence. See H. BLOCH & G. GELs, MAN, CRIME AND SOCIETY 265 (1962).
108. See N.Y. Times, July 28, 1968, § IV at 6; 1967 Hearings 109 (statement of
F. Ludwig); 1968 Hearings 177 (statement of A. Sills); id. at 45 (statement of H.
Fong); id. at 601 (statement of R. Clark).
109. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 6101-6119 (1973).
110. 1938 UCR at 128, 136.

111. See 1968 Hearings 177 (statement of A. Sills).
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rates are low relative to the nation as a whole, they were even lower
prior to the gun law's adoption." 2 Likewise, Hawaii's homicide rate
was but half the national average even before the Hawaiian controls
were enacted, and its rate has rapidly escalated since."' In each case,
the relatively low homicide rates existed prior to the enactment of the
controls, strongly suggesting that the cause of the relatively low rates
is to be found in factors other than the firearm regulations." 4 A close
examination of the homicide rates of New York City, often cited as
an example of an area with strict controls and few homicides," 5 also
supports the conclusion that homicide rates are determined by factors
other than controls. In 1966, when the city's overall homicide rate
was 8.4, the rates in various boroughs ranged from 3.26 in Queens to
15.13 in Manhattan." 6 It appears that the same degree of controls
may be consistent with either very low or very high homicide rates,
depending upon other factors such as the cultural or economic
structure of the area. In view of the bias commonly found in comparisons, the possibility of a common cultural causation, and evidence that
controls are not the major determinant of homicide rates, simple comparisons seem unable to establish the effectiveness of controls.
Even if it is assumed that simple comparisons are a valid method
of assessing control effectiveness, there is still reason to doubt that
such comparisons prove that controls depress homicide rates. If state
and regional comparisons are valid assessments of effectiveness, and
112. The New Jersey rate for homicides was 2.5 in 1961 and had risen to 3.2 to
1965. Between 1966 and 1968, rates rose from 3.5 to 5.1. See 1961 UCR at 46; 1965

UCR at 64; 1966 UCR at 73; 1968 UCR at 71.
113. The controls referred to are Hawaiian law as enacted in 1967. 1968 Hearings 45 (statement of H. Fong); see HAwAnI REV. STAT. §§ 134-2 to -7, as amended
(Supp. 1973). In 1962, five years before the enactment, the Hawaiian homicide rate
was 2.9, compared to a 4.5 national average; its rate in 1966, just before the imposition

of controls, was also 2.9, as against a national average of 5.6.

1962 UCR at 35, 43;

1966 UCR at 58, 68. By 1972, five years after the law's passage, the Hawaiian rates
had climbed to 6.8 per 100,000, equal to approximately two-thirds of the 8.9 nation-

wide rate. 1972 UCR at 61, 70.
114. A similar tendency of low homicide rates to precede rather than follow the
adoption of firearm controls is found when international comparisons are employed.
Britain's extremely low homicide rate has been attributed to the strict British controls.
See R. CLARK, supra note 94, at 105. The British controls, in their present scope

and strictness, date from 1937.

1971 Hearings 251 (statement of C. Greenwood).

Comparisons made considerably before 1937 nonetheless found the British homicide

rate to be but a fraction of the American rate.
27-28 (1932).

H.

BREARLY,

HOMICIDE

IN THE

See also Morris & Blom-Cooper, Homicide in England, in

U.S.

STUDIES IN

30 (Wolfgang ed. 1967).
115. See 1968 Hearings 91 (statement of J. Lindsay); Note, Firearms: Problems

HOMICIDE

of Controls, 80 HA v. L. REv. 1328, 1345 (1967).

116. 1967 Hearings707 (statement of A. Krug).
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if firearm controls substantially lower homicide rates, a strong and consistent relation between controls and lower rates, and a lack of controls and higher rates, should be found.
At present, no consistent relationship exists between the presence
of controls and low homicide rates. On the regional level, the northcentral states, with few controls 1 7 have the lowest regional homicide
rate in the nation."" On the state level, many non-controlling states
have rates comparable to or lower than the most frequently cited
controlling states, as the following comparison illustrates: 119
CONTROLLING STATES

NONCONTROLLING

State

State

1972 Homicide Rate

STATES

1972 Homicide Rate
3.8
Idaho
Kansas
4.0
New York
11.0
Minnesota
2.4
New Jersey
6.5
Montana
2.5
Massachusetts
3.7
N. Dakota
1.2
Rhode Island
1.3
Utah
2.9
1.7
Vermont
6.1
W. Virginia
Wyoming
4.1
It should also be noted that there are a few states outside the Northeast which have control systems and whose rates should be taken into
consideration along with the Northeastern control states. California's
firearm controls have been praised by advocates of controls, 12 0 yet
that state has a 8.8 homicide rate. 2 ' This is well over the 7.3 rate
of neighboring Arizona, 22 which has been mentioned as an example of a noncontrolling state with high homicide rates. 123 North
Carolina requires permits for handgun purchases 124 and annual handgun registration. 2 5 Yet North Carolina's 1972 rate was 12.8, almost
50% higher than the national average.' 26 Mississippi registers all pis117. See generally Benenson, A Controlled Look at Gun Controls, 14 N.Y.L.F.

718, 724 (1968). The Northcentral states also have a rate of firearm ownership 50%
higher than that of the Northeast. NEWTON & ZIMRNG 10.
118. See 1972 UCR, table 3; TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 30.
119. Data taken from 1972 UCR, table 5.
120. 1968 Hearings 603 (statement of R. Hruska); see id. at 655 (exhibit).
121. 1972 UCR, table 4.
122. Id.

123. See R. CLARK, supra note 94, at 104.
124. N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-402 (1969), as amended N.C.

GEN. STAT.

14-402 (Supp.

1973).
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-407 (1969), as amended N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-407 (Supp.
1973).
126. 1972 UCR, table 4.
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tols and most rifles,' 2 7 yet its homicide rate was an even higher 15.4.128
It would seem from this that no strong and consistent relationship
exists between stricter controls and lower homicide rates at a given
point in time.
Such a relationship is also absent when comparisons are made
between rates in a given area before and after the adoption of a control ordinance. Firearm controls are often adopted as part of a general anticrime program, and it is impossible to determine from comparisons alone what retardation of homicide rates was due to controls
and what part was due to other anticrime provisions. For example,
a temporary decline in Philadelphia's homicide rate has been cited as
proof of the effectiveness of that city's controls. 12 9 Yet in the same
year that controls were imposed, the Philadelphia police force was
augmented by over a thousand men.' 3 ° There is good reason to believe that the controls did not cause the reduction in the homicide rate.
The proportion of Philadelphia murders committed with firearms remained the same before and after the adoption of controls.' 3 ' Whatever was responsible for the homicide decline therefore reduced both
gun and non-gun homicides to the same degree. Firearm controls,
however, cannot depress non-gun homicideq rates; only some factor
which influences all homicides, regardless of weapon employed, could
create such a proportionate reduction. As a result, the contention that
the temporary decline in Philadelphia's homicide rate was due to controls seem highly dubious. Toledo, Ohio has also been cited as an
area where controls have proven beneficial.' 32 There gun and nongun homicides both went into a steep decline during 'the period in question. 1 33 It seems likely that these temporary declines cannot of themselves demonstrate that firearm controls create a lower homicide rate.
Even if it is assumed that comparisons over a period of time are
a valid method of determining the impact of controls, an analysis of
areas which have adopted firearm controls in recent years discloses
127. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 45-9-1 (1972); see 1968 Hearings 364 (report of Stan-

ford Research Institute).
128. 1972 UCR, table 4.
129. See Bakal, The Failure of Federal Gun Control, SATURDAY REVIEW, July 3,

1971, at 14.
130. Compare 1964 UCR 155, with 1965 UCR 160.

See generally 1967 Hearings

714 (statement of M. Benenson).
131. Bakal, The Failure of Federal Gun Control, SATURDAY REVIEW, July 3, 1971,
at 14.
132. Id.

133. 1969 Hearings59 (statement of J. Burkhart).
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no consistent relationship between controls and long-term declines in
homicide rates. Between 1969 and 1970, Philadelphia rates jumped
from 7.5 to 9.3, and Toledo rates went from 3.2 to 5.9,111 increases
respectively of 28% and 65% over a year. In 1966 New Jersey
adopted the strictest statewide controls in the nation. 13 5 The following
two years saw a 45% increase in the homicide rate, 8 0 a rise greater
than had occurred in the five years preceding adoption. 3 7 The experience of Hawaii since the adoption of a strict law in 1967118 is
hardly more encouraging; the homicide rate has more than doubled
in the intervening five years." 9 In the seven years which have passed
since Las Vegas and Clark County, Nevada, adopted handgun registrahion,'" homicide rates there have risen from 8.0 to 18.3.1'1 In 1968,
new controls were adopted or existing controls augmented in
Chicago,' 4 2 the District of Columbia, 4 ' Miami,'" San Francisco,"'
and New York City.' 4 6 The intervening years have seen increases
in homicide rates in each of these cities. 1 4 7 Comparisons over a
period of time at the regional level also suggest that there is no strong
relationship between controls and declining homicide rates. Between
134. Compare 1969 UCR 83, with 1970 UCR 92, 95.

ings 688 (statement of M. Benenson).
phia and 5.9 in Toledo.

See generally 1967 Hear-

By 1972, rates had risen to 10.7 in Philadel-

1972 UCR, table 5.

135. See 1968 Hearings 143-44 (statement of A. Sills).
136. Between 1966 and 1968 the rate jumped from 3.5 to 5.1 mutrders per 100,000
population. Compare 1966 UCR 73, with 1968 UCR 71. Nationwide rates increased
by about 21% over the same period. Compare 1966 UCR 5, with 1968 UCR 7.
137. During this period, rates went from 2.5 to 3.5 per 100,000. Compare 1966

UCR 73, with 1968 UCR 71.
138. See HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 134-2 to -7, as amended (Supp. 1973) and authorities cited note 113 supra.

139. The rate increased from 2.4 in 1967 to 6.8 in 1972.

Compare 1967 UCR

70, with 1972 UCR 70; cf. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 134-2 to -7, as amended (Supp.
1973), and authorities cited note 113 and accompanying text supra.
140. NEWTON & ZIMRING 91 n.22.
141. Compare 1965 UCR 79, with 1972 UCR 85.
142. See CHiCAGO, ILL., MUNICiPAL CODE §§ 11.1-.2 (1968).
143. See DisTRIcr OF COLUMBIA, POLICE REGULATIONS art. 51, 54 (1968).

144.
145.
146.
147.
adopted

See MIAMI, FLA., CODE §§ 25.104-.119 (1968).
See SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., MUNIciPAL CODE ch. VIII, § 1(610) (1968).
See NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE §§ 436-6.0 to -6.16 (1968).
The following table sets out homicide rates prevailing when controls were
in 1968, as well as the rates for years before and four years after the adoption:
City
Homicide rates
1964
1968
1972
Chicago
7.2
10.7
11.5
Miami
New York City

6.2
6.1

12.5
8.5

Toledo

2.3

4.0

5.9

Washington, D.C.
See 1964, 1968, 1972 UCR.

8.4

9.5

12.4

San Francisco

4.3

7.7

14.3
19.1

8.6
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1933 and 1965, homicide rates in the Southern and Rocky Mountain
states fell by 33% to 50%, while rates in the New England states, where

most control programs had been instituted, increased.' 48 To consider
a more recent time period, 1971 saw significant rate declines in no
major control state and in three noncontrol states, and minor decreases
in one control as against three noncontrol states. 14 9 In 1972, one control state had a major decline, as against three noncontrol states, and
minor declines were noted in one control state in comparison to eight
noncontrol states.'8 0 In view of the tendency for homicide rates to
continue to increase following the imposition of controls, and the tendency of rate declines to affect impartially both control and noncontrol
states, no consistent relationship appears to exist between imposition
1
of controls and homicide rate declines. 5
StatisticalStudies
In an effort to refine the simple comparison, several writers have
employed statistical methods to evaluate the effectiveness of existing

control systems. 152 Perhaps the most elaborate application of statistical methods to an assessment of existing controls was undertaken by
148. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 31 n.1 (1967).
149. States with significant declines (over 30%) were Arizona, Utah and South
Dakota; lesser declines occurred in Rhode Island, Oregon, Virginia and Wyoming. 1971
UCR, table 3.
150. Significant decreases occurred in Rhode Island, Kansas, Montana and Wyoming; lesser declines were noted in Massachusetts, West Virginia, Iowa, Florida, Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas and New Mexico; rates remained stable in North
and South Dakota. 1972 UCR, table 3.
151. It has been argued that the absence of this relationship is due to the evasion
of state and local controls by purchase of firearms in nearby areas which lack controls.
See, e.g., NEWTON & ZIMRING 91, 94; R. CLARK, supra note 94, at 113; 1967 Hearings
395-401 (exhibits). This seems to employ a double standard; homicide declines are
credited to the controls, homicide increases are blamed on the lack of nearby controls.
For example, during the most recent hearings Mayor Lindsay of New York City estimated that there were presently eight million illegal guns in his city, or about one for
every man, woman and child residing there. See 1971 Hearings 190. Yet later he
suggested that the New York City controls were restraining homicides: "New York
City, on homicide, which is what all those handguns are about, still is no. 16 out of
the 25 largest cities in the country. Atlanta has more than three times the per capita
murder rate as New York City." 1971 Hearings 195. One advocate of controls has
authored a book devoting an entire chapter to "The Futility of State Laws" and has
also published an article attributing temporary retardation of homicide rates in certain
cities to the adoption of local controls. See C. BAKAL, THE RIGTrr To BEAR ARMs ch.
8, at 149 (1966); Bakal, The Failure of Federal Gun Control, SATURDAY REvIEW, July
3, 1971, at 14. See also text accompanying note 227 infra.
152. Certain applications of statistics to assessing the likelihood that future controls would prove effective will be dealt with under the assessment of future controls.
This section will deal exclusively with studies based upon the experience of states with
existing control systems.
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Geisel, Roll, and Wettick.' 5 The Geisel study centers upon the findig of a relationship between homicide levels as measured by murder
rates and the degree -of firearms controls imposed in various states
and cities. The study begins by assigning numerical values to various
forms of firearm controls employed in different areas.'
The authors
then attempt to compensate for factors other than controls which might
explain variations in homicide rates. On the basis of the relationship
reported between firearm controls and death rates, the authors reach
the conclusion that nationwide imposition of controls equal in effectiveness to those in New Jersey might save several thousand lives
annually.

The Geisel study brings to bear an impressive array of statistical
tools.

It should be recognized, however, that it fails to answer the

central question in the debate over firearm controls: whether firearm
controls have caused lower homicide rates. The existence of a relationship does not establish that the relationship is due to causation."'
Two alternate explanations exist which are equally reasonable.

The

first is the possibility of common causation, the possibility that societal
factors determine both the proclivity toward violence and the aversion
to adopting firearm controls. 15 The tendency of relatively low homicide rates to antedate controls lends support to this explanation.' 5 7 A
second explanation lies in -the failure of the Geisel study to take into
account the effect of regional variations in homicidal proclivities.' s
Those that do
Very few states have truly strict firearm controls.'
153. Geisel, Roll, Wettick, The Effectiveness of State and Local Regulation of
Handguns: A Statistical Analysis, 1969 DUKE L.J. 647.
154. For example, prohibitions against possession by minors, felons, addicts, alcoholics and the mentally ill are each assigned a weight of 1 unit. A licensing requirement is assigned 8 units. Id.
155. The authors of the study seem somewhat equivocal on the issue of causation.
One the one hand, they caution that "[t]he coefficients of certain demographic variables
may not indicate a causal relation. The ecology of crime is more complex than this
study's simple equations portray." Geisel, supra note 153, at 669 (emphasis in original). On the other hand, they state as their conclusion that "many lives would be
saved if all states increased their level of control to that of New Jersey". Id. at 647.
156. See text accompanying notes 106-107 supra.
157. See text accompanying notes 108-113 supra; cf. text accompanying notes
134-150 supra. A very early study of homicide, conducted in 1880, concluded that the
southern states had extremely high homicide rates relative to New England even prior
to the Civil War. Gastil, Homicide and a Regional Culture of Violence, 36 AM. SoCIOLOGICAL REV. 412, 417 (1971). This would antedate even New York's Sullivan Law
by half a century.
158. Geisel, supra note 153, at 669.
159. NEWTON & ZIMRING 181. Indeed, Geisel acknowledges that, since such a
large proportion of homicides are committed by persons never convicted of crime or
adjudged mentally defective or alcoholic, the most likely explanation for a reduction
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are clustered in the northeastern portion of the nation, and possess
many common cultural features which tend to depress homicide

rates.1"' Several studies have found that persons raised in the southeastern United States have a significantly higher homicide propensity
than those raised in the northeastern United States, even where both
groups have migrated to a new region, share the same access to firearms and are subject to the same controls.' 6 ' Even if this relationship between controls and lower cultural proclivities to violence is pure

coincidence, the relatively low homicide rates in control states may
nevertheless be explained by location of states with strict controls
solely in regions with low tendencies toward violence. The Geisel
study therefore should not be interpreted, as the author admits, as conclusively establishing that firearm controls have caused a reduction in
the homicide rate." 2
A more recent study by Seitz' 63 approaches the assessment of
controls in a different way. Seitz assigns a value of 1.0 to states that
have both carrying and purchasing restrictions, and 0.0 to those states
lacking either or both of these restrictions.'
Acknowledging that controls would have differing impacts on the "violent subculture" and on
the larger society, Seitz seeks to take this into account by separating
white and non-white homicide rates and treating each separately. " 5
in homicides by controls is that the controls achieved a significant across-the-board reduction in firearms possession. Geisel, supra note 153, at 267, 269. Clearly, a significant reduction in general ownership of firearms requires a comparatively strict law and
not merely registration or permissive licensing. NEWTON & ZIMmNG 83.

160. See

NEWTON& ZIMRING

181:

Only two American jurisdictions, New York and Massachusetts, have attempted restrictive pistol licensing on a statewide basis. Because the number
of restrictive licensing jurisdictions is so small, and because both of them are
located in the Northeast, comparing the crime statistics of these states to
other states through the use of multi-variate correlation is inappropriate. Id.
See also authorities cited note 102 supra.
161. See Gastil, 'Homicide and a Regional Culture of Violence, 36 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 412 (1971); cf. Pettigrew & Spier, The Ecological Structure of Negro
Homicide, in CRIME IN AMERICA 69 (B. Cohen ed. 1970). See also M. WOLFGANG,
PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 331 (1958).
162. A significant part of the saving in lives projected by the Geisel study consisted not of reductions in homicide, but in suicide and firearm accidents; indeed, the
study found that the correlation between controls and homicide were weaker than that
between controls and suicide. Geisel, supra note 153, at 672. The question of whether
it is proper for government to render criminal the ownership of a firearm by an individual, on the ground that ownership might prove harmful to himself, is beyond the
scope of this article. For a general discussion of the difficulties involved in attempting
to lower suicides by firearm controls see NEWTON & ZIMRING at xii, 35.
163. Seitz, Firearms, Homicides and Gun Control Effectiveness, 6 LAW & Soc.
REV.

595 (1972).

164.
165.

Id. at 605.
Id. at 604.
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He then ascertains the relationship between controls and white and
non-white murder rates in each state by means of multiple regression
techniques. On the basis of the relationships thus found, Seitz concludes that the adoption of carrying and purchasing restrictions nationwide would reduce homicide rates within the violent subculture by 2%,
and would reduce rates by 56% in the majority population. 6 '
Several weaknesses present in the Seitz study tend to undermine
its conclusions. Like the Geisel approach, this study cannot be taken
to prove causation; an explanation based upon common causation or
cultural differences is equally plausible. 16 In addition, the factors
employed by Seitz to represent the degree of firearms control in each
state and the impact of a "violent subculture" on homicide rates pose
problems not found in the Geisel study.
In assessing the effectiveness of controls in each state, Seitz imposes a simple all-or-nothing test; no value is assigned if the state lacks
either carrying or purchasing restrictions, and a unitary value is
assigned if a state has both. 6 8 This seems a rather crude manner
of assessing the strength of controls. As Seitz himself admits,
' 69
"[t]here is a wide variety of carrying and purchasing restrictions."'
The effect is to treat the least stringent restrictions as if they had the
same impact as the most stringent, a result which Seitz does not justify. 1'70 His assessment of state firearm controls thus seems of questionable validity.
A second failing of the Seitz approach is his attempt to compensate for the effects of a violent subculture. Realizing the necessity
of compensating for cultural differences and their impact on homicide
rates, Seitz divides American society into two parts, white and nonwhite:
Since for our purposes the subculture of violence is tolerably coterminous with the nonwhite population, it is relatively simple to
control for the differences in cultural7 context by simply separating
white and non-white homicide rates.' '
166. Id. at 609.
167. See text accompanying notes 156-161 supra.
168. Seitz, supra note 163, at 605.
169. Id. at 611 n.13.
170. Seitz attempts to justify this treatment on two grounds: first, to employ
separate variables would unduly complicate the equations and perhaps render them invalid; second, most policy makers will wish to adopt both carrying and purchasing restrictions together. Id. at 611, n.13. Neither of these arguments forms a valid reason
for lumping all types of carrying and purchasing restrictions under a single heading
and assuming that their impact is equal.
171. Id. at 604.
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Seitz's assumption of a neat racial demarcation, which coincides nicely
with cultural demarcations, is unjustified.' 7 2 Moreover, it ignores a
substantial portion of the white murders who belong to social groups
emphasizing violence.' 73 For example, the social structure of the
Southeast, where 44% of total U.S. homicides occur,' 74 is strongly
inclined toward violence among all races. 75 Seitz's assumptions ignore the impact of a "violent subculture" upon white homicides
and thus lead him to understate the impact of the "violent subculture" upon total homicide rates. Since he concludes that controls
-would reduce homicides by 56% in the non-violent -culture, as
opposed to only 2% in the "violent culture,"'176 to the extent that the
role of the "violent subculture" is understated, Seitz's conclusion overstates the total nationwide effect of controls by a factor of 28. The
Seitz approach is therefore of doubtful value in determining control
effectiveness; the techniques employed to assess the effect of controls
and the extent of cultural inclinations toward violence are arbitrary
and unjustified and any relationships found cannot be proven to be
causal in nature.
The lack of an ascertainable causal relationship between homicide rates and access to firearms is further illustrated by Chart I. Percentages of homicides accomplished with firearms in each state, as determined in a study spanning the period 1962 - 1966,77 is employed
as an indicator of firearms availability. Since this measure indicates
how often murders in each state actually obtain and use firearms,
it is a reasonably accurate gauge of the availability of firearms to
potential murderers. 7 Against this measure is plotted each state's
172. See G. Void, ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
Nov. 1952, at 5; H. BLOCH & G. GELS, MAN CRIME AND SOCIETY 262 (1962).

SCIENCES,

Void notes that
Lest anyone conclude . . . that regional differences in homicide are equivalent to, or due only to differences in the proportions of total population classified as other than white, attention is invited to the similar consistent and
large differences in the rates as between regions for the white group alone.
G. Vold, supra, at 5.
173. See authorities cited note 102 supra.
174. 1972 UCR 6.
175. See authorities cited note 102 supra.
176. Seitz, supra note 163, at 609.
177. See 1967 Hearings 102 (exhibit).
178. Indeed, the percentage of murders accomplished with firearms in control and
noncontrol states is often cited by advocates of controls, who argue that a low percentage indicates to a successful control system. See, e.g., C. BAKAL, THE RIGHT To
BEAR ARMS 270 (1966); R. CLARK, supra note 94, at 104; 1967 Hearings 21 (statement
of J. Tydings); 1971 Hearings 377-78 (statement of B. Bayh). The construction of
this graph is intended to determine whether lower homicide rates are actually created

by lower percentage use of firearms.
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homicide rate for 1972, the most recent year available. 179 The result
should indicate if there is any strong relationship between access to
firearms and the homicide rate.
On the face of the chart no significant relationship is apparent.
The state of Vermont has the highest percentage of firearm use in
homicide (100%) and yet is tied for the fourth lowest homicide rate
The states in the lowest homicide rate
of the fifty states (1.7).
bracket, 1.0-1.9, have percentages of firearms use ranging from 17%
to 100%, indicating that very low homicide rates may coincide with
both very high and very low uses of firearms in homicide. If we examine the figures on the basis of percentage use of firearms, three
states are tied at 67% use of firearms in homicide, indicating an approximately equal access to guns. Yet the homicide rates range from
1.7 to 13.5 to 16.0, differing by a factor of eleven. No less than five
states are tied at 62% use: Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Oklahoma and
Oregon. Homicide rates in these states stand at 1.7, 5.5, 6.0, 7.0 and
13.2, the extremes differing by a factor of eight. There does not seem
to be any strong or consistent relationship between firearms availability as indicated by percentage use in homicides and the overall
homicide rate of a state. Low accessibility is compatible with both
high and low murder rates, and low homicide rates may occur in the
presence of either great or minor access to firearms.
It appears, after an examination of assessments of existing controls, that neither simple comparisons nor statistical correlations can
be taken to show a causal relation between the existence of controls
and lower homicide rates. Too many factors, aside from controls, can
influence rates and cause the presence of controls and lower homicide
rates to coincide. The determination of whether additional federal
firearm controls should be imposed in the future must be made upon
a careful examination of the features and weaknesses of the particular
controls proposed, instead of comparisons involving controls presently
existing at the state and local level.
Additional Federal Firearm Controls
The primary objective of additional firearm regulations is the reduction of the homicide rate. 180 To achieve this, controls must do
179. See 1972 UCR, table 4.
180. One supporter of controls has stated:

"It would be fairly easy to reduce the

number of murders. Rational and effective gun laws would cut homicide sharply."
Norval Morris, quoted in Star, Shocking Rise of Murder, LOOK, Sept. 19, 1967, at 32.
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more than merely register firearms or record their owners.'

The

controls would have to employ some form of restrictions limiting the
classes of persons who may own firearms. Before these restrictions
could be effective, however, certain practical impediments must be
overcome. These impediments may be divided into four categories;
the mass of firearms to be controlled, the difficulty of predicting future

murderers, the availability of illegal firearms, and the use of substitute
weapons.
The sheer mass of firearms currently in private hands poses a
serious problem for the enforcement of a nationwide control program.

It is estimated that there are as many as fifty million firearm owners
and two hundred million firearms privately owned within the United
States. 82 It seems unlikely that this number would be materially re-

duced by the imposition of a system of firearm controls.

The long

useful life of a firearm makes it unlikely that the passage of time
would materially reduce ownership.' 8 3 Since many firearms are kept
secretly in the owner's house for protection purposes,18 4 the search and
181. Mere registration or licensing would not deter a professional criminal, for he
could be traced through his weapon only in the unlikely event that they left the firearm
behind. 1967 Hearings 971 (statement of J. Schooley). Presently, a criminal who
leaves his weapon behind runs the risk of being traced by fingerprints or dealer's records, not to mention being shot in the back by his intended victim. Mere registration
would not deter those who kill in a fit of rage, for those individuals usually kill without
consideration of the probability of detection. See Star, Shocking Rise of Murder,
LooK, Sept. 19, 1967, at 33; cf. 1971 UCR 32 (84% of murders are presently cleared
by arrest). A system which would file test bullets from each firearm and attempt to
match rifling striations on crime bullets with those from registered guns is not workable considering the present state of ballistics science. No system of classification capable of filing the millions of test bullets which would be required, in a way that would
enable practical matching of a given bullet with test bullets, has yet been devised.
Moreover, since bullets fired from the same gun may differ greatly under any but the
most detailed examinations, individual matching under a microscope is necessary, and
several test bullets must be available. Finally, the striations on the test bullet would
not necessarily match those of the firearm at a later date. The markings on test bullets can change over time, and the markings of the barrel change with the effects of
wear, rust and fouling from fired bullets. See NEWTON & ZIMp.NG 135; G. BuuRxu,
THE IDENTIFICATION OF FIREARMS AND FORENSIC BALLISTICS 144-45, 148-51,
161-66
(1962); J. DAVIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO TOOL MARKS, FIREARMS AND THE STRIAGRAPH
107-08, 141-42 (1958); A. SVENSSON & 0. WENDELL, TECHNIQUES OF CRIME SCENE INvESTIGATION 244, 249 (1965).
Some of the cheaper pistols are manufactured from lowgrade metals which change striations completely after each shot, rendering identification impossible. 1971 Hearings 121 (statement of J. Wilson).
182. 1968 Hearings 542 (statement of T. Kimball); see id. at 204 (statement of
H. Glassen); 1969 Hearings 21 (statement of J. Tydings); id. at 45-46 (statement of
R. Thrower); Benenson, supra note 96, at 719. To the extent that these estimates are
based on surveys, ownership is probably underestimated. NEWTON & ZIMRING 6.
183. The useful life of a firearm is between ten and one hundred thousand shots
fired. NEWTON & ZIMRING 5 n.9. One-quarter of the American-made guns confiscated
by police in New York City are over a half-century old. Id. at 50.
184. Benenson, supra note 96, at 743.
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seizure requirements of the fourth amendment 85 operate to restrict
the ability of the authorities to discover these weapons. 1 86 Thus the
sheer mass of firearms now owned would substantially burden enforcement and administration of any firearms regulations. 87

Unless controls are aimed at the complete abolition of private
firearm ownership,18 8 a reasonably accurate method of determining
who may and may not obtain firearms must be employed. Since the

primary problem consists of denying firearms to persons who will
commit murder in the future, the administrators of the controls must
be able to identify potential murderers. An inability -to predict which
persons will commit murder would result in failure of the control
system to reduce homicides, since it would be impossible to determine
who should and should not be allowed to own firearms.
The ability to distinguish future murderers depends upon the existence of an accurate and practical indicator of homicidal proclivities.
Prior convictions are often used as such an indicator. 8 ' Studies have
shown, however, that in excess of 70% of murderers were first-time

offenders.190 Thus, it appears that prior convictions do not necessarily
185. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 41 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See generally McKay,
Mapp v. Ohio, The Exclusionary Rule and the Right of Privacy, 15 Auz. L. REv. 327
(1973).
186. NEWTON & ZIMRING 81 n.1; see 1967 Hearings at 114 (statement of F. Ludwig). Mr. Ludwig, a New York prosecutor, complained to the committee that "We
have been somewhat handicapped in the seizure of guns since Mapp v. Ohio came
down from the Supreme Court. . . .' Id.
187. See generally 1969 Hearings 45-46 (statement of R. Thrower).
188. This seems unlikely. See 1968 Hearings 47 (statement of E. Brooke) ("I
know of no member of Congress who wants to impair the legitimate uses of firearms");
J. Clark, The Role of the Federal Government in Combatting Violence in CRIME IN
URBAN SociETY 85 (1970)
("It should be stressed that nobody, least of all Senator
Tydings and his colleagues, has ever suggested that any law abiding person should be
denied ownership of a gun.") The advocates of controls often stress that such controls
would prove no great burden to the average gun owner. See, e.g., 1967 Hearings 344
(statement of A. Gomberg); 1968 Hearings 23 (statement of J. Tydings); 1969 Hearings 25 (statement of J. Tydings); C. BAKAL, supra note 178, at 327-28; R. CLARK,
supra note 94, at 110.
189. See, e.g, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1970); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 134-7 (Supp. 1973);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 24-3(d), 24-3.1(a)(3) (1973); MICH. ANN. STAT. tit. 28,
§ 28.92 (Supp. 1973).
190. See W. RECKLESS, THE CRIME PROBLEM 258-59 (4th ed. 1967). NEWTON
& ZIMRING 77 n.10; H. BLOCH & G. GEls, MAN CRIME AND SOCIETY 272 (1962); S.
PALMER, A STUDy OF MURDER 21 (1960); M. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL
HOMICIDE 168-69 (1958); H. BREARLY, HOMICIDE IN THE U.S. 85 (1932); cf. Stanton,
Murders on Parole, 15 CRIME & DEL. 149 (1969). Wolfgang's own survey found a
high proportion of arrest records among murders; data on convictions was not given.
The sample may have been atypical, since Wolfgang also found 47% of the victims
of murder to have such records. M. WOLFGANG, supra, at 175.
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indicate homicidal proclivities, and, as a result, denial of firearms permits on such a basis would not materially reduce the homicide rate."'
Another frequently employed indicator of potential murderers is a
record of prior commitment to a mental institution.'9 2 Several studies
have found no significant difference in violent criminal activity between former mental patients and the general public;"'a one study
found former patients to have a crime rate of less .than one-twelfth
that of the general population.'
This becomes less surprising when
it is understood that commitments are more often based on passivity
than on violence' 9 5 and that most murderers display no outward signs
of mental disorder.' 9 6 In addition to being ineffective, the use of
prior commitment records may create serious inequities. Approximately 10% of all Americans will be committed at some time during

191. Nor does the use of arrest, rather than conviction, records seem to improve
matters. Approximately 40% of all American males will be arrested at some time during their lives. Hess, Abuse of the Record of Arrest Not Leading to Conviction, 13
CRIME & DEL. 494 (1967).
Such a criterion would seem to contravene the presumption of innocence and to open the way for abuses of the arrest power. Id.; cf. Hearings
on Preventative Detention before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Com. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). In addition, the use of arrest
records as an employment criterion has been found to effectively create unjustified
racial discrimination. See Gregory v. Litton Systems, 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal.
1970), aff'd 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972), reviewed in 6 HARVARD Civ. RIGHTS-CIV.
LIB. L. REV. 166 (1970). See also National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, National Violence Commission Report in THE CRIMINAL IN SOCIETY

258-59 (1971).
192. See, e.g, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 24-3(e) to 243.1(a)(5) (1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 28.92 (Supp. 1973).
193. Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
1st & 2d Sess. 277 (1970) (statement of B. Ennis); see B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY vii, 225 (1972); G. Morris, Criminality and the Right to Treatment in THE
MENTALLY ILL AND THE RiGrr TO TREATMENT 121-24 (1970); Livermore, Malmquist
& Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 83 n.22
(1969); Benenson, supra note 96, at 745 n.89; Rappaport, Dangerousness and the
Mentally Ill Criminal, 21 S.C.L. REV. 23 (1968); Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal
Process: a Knife that Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRIAL, Feb.-Mar. 1968, at 32-34; cf. Schreiber,
Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarceration of Dangerous Criminals: Perspectives and
Problems, 56 VAL. L. REV. 602, 619 (1970).
194. See B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY 225 (1972).
195. Hearings on the Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
43 (1961) (statement of A. Deutsch) [hereinafter cited as Rights of the Mentally Ill].
See also B. ENNIS, supra note 194, at 217.
196. Guttmacher, The Normal Murderer in READINGS IN CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY 100 (1972); see Glasser, Kenefich & O'Leary, The Violent Offender in CRrrICAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY OF CRIME 110-11 (1968); cf. 1967 Hearings 883 (statement

of P. Dominick).
REv. 156 (1971).

But see Tupin, Causes of Violence by Individuals, 21 DEPAUL L.
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their lives.1" 7 Studies in several states have shown that the decision
to commit is often arbitrary and unjust.'93 There is also reason to
believe that commitments show strong economic and racial bias. 99 it

therefore appears that restricting firearm ownership on the basis of
prior commitment would not materially reduce the homicide rate and
would operate on an arbitrary basis.
The use of psychiatric testing has been occasionally suggested as
a device for predicting future homicide offenders under a firearm
control system.2 00 It is unlikely, however, that psychiatric testing can

accurately discern in advance the few citizens who will commit murders. Most murderers do not show signs of marked psychosis, 20 1 and
present techniques are unable to predict violence.2 °2 In addition to
ineffectiveness, a program of mandatory psychiatric testing for fifty
million firearm owners 203 would permit certain abuses. The criteria
for mental illness is arbitrary, 20 4 and most tests overpredict, stigmatiz-

ing harmless persons as potentially dangerous.205
such tests suggests that they are susceptible to

Experience with

misuse20 6

and they are

invasive of privacy.2 0 7 Such a program of testing may also be faulted
197. Rights of the Mentally Ill 11 (statement of A. Wiley); B. ENNIS, supra note
193, at vii.
198. For a comprehensive study of commitment procedures in Arizona see Special
Project, The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona,
13 ARIz. L. REv. 1 (1971). It has been estimated that up to two-thirds of the patients
presently confined in mental institutions are being held without proper legal grounds.
See Rights of the Mentally Ill12 (statement of A. Wiley). Studies in several states
have shown that the commitment hearings often occupy less than five minutes and that
the person involved is in practice presumed insane and given the burden of establishing
his sanity in that short period. See, e.g., Special Project, supra, at 38-39; Kutuer, Commitments Proceedings-Due Process, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 383-85 (1962); Scheff, supra
note 193, at 400, 403-04, 409; Rights of the Mentally Ill 25 (Statement of W. Creech);
cf. Bacon, Incompetency to Stand Trial: Commitment to an Inclusive Test, 42 S. CAL.
L. REv. 444, 452 (1969).
199. B. ENNIS, supra note 194, at 220-21.
200. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 150 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
1968 Hearings 59 (statement of R. Clark). See also 1968 Hearings 16 (exhibit five).
201. See note 196 supra.
202. An inquiry by a California state legislative committee came to the conclusion
that "the evidence indicates that there are no tests that can predict an individual's capacity for dangerous behavior."
Special Project, supra note 198, at 97. See also
Schreiber, Indefinite Therapeutic Incarceration of Dangerous Criminals: Perspectives
and Problems, 56 VA. L. REv. 602, 619-20 (1970); N. WALKER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BarrAIN, ch. 7 (1968).
203. See note 182 supra.
204. See B. ENNIs, supra note 194, at 217; Scheff, supra note 193, at 409; Special
Project, supra note 198, at 64-65. See generally T. SzAsz, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY
(1969).
205. Schreiber, supra note 202, at 619-20; Creech, Psychological Testing and Constitutional Rights, 1966 DUKE L.J. 332, 356-57.
206. Creech, supra note 205, at 347.
207. Id. Compare Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) ("fingerprinting
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on practical grounds. The fifty million firearms owners 20 8 outnumber
the 23,000 certified psychiatrists 0 9 by over two thousand to one.

Assuming a forty-four week work year, and a one-hour interview per
person, each psychiatrist would have to assume an additional 38 hours
of work weekly. 210 In light of their present workweek of 50 hours, 1'

such a burden is utter absurdity.
It would appear, therefore, that prediction of future murderers

by criminal records, mental commitments, or psychiatric testing is exceedingly difficult. To the extent that such predictions cannot be
made, firearms regulations cannot deny firearms to potential murderers and thus can hardly be expected to significantly reduce the homicide rate.

Assuming that a practical, accurate, and fair predictor of homicidal proclivities is found, and that prospective murderers are denied legal
access to firearms, the effectiveness of gun controls in reducing the
homicide rate may, nevertheless, be circumscribed by the possibility
of "black market" firearm acquisitions. This source of firearms can

be kept well supplied by thefts or other illegal means.212

Obtaining

involves none of the probing into an individual's private life or thoughts that marks an
interrogation or search ..
"), with Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 150 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas took the position that the stop-and-frisk power
was unnecessary to protect police, arguing that firearm control statute, which included
mandatory psychiatric examinations, would be as effective and, unlike stop and frisk,
would not violate the right of privacy. But such a program would seem far more invasive of the privacy and dignity of the individual than is the stop-and-frisk power.
A government mandated probing of the mental processes of individuals would seem
more invasive of privacy than would be a pat-down of the outer clothing. Since the
examination would encompass approximately fifty million persons, it would seem a
quantitatively greater invasion as well. Finally, the government interest in invading
the privacy of a member of a large group, chosen at random, would seem far less than
that involved in invading the privacy of a particular individual, where there was at
least some cause to conclude the individual was armed and dangerous to the officer.
208. See authorities cited note 182 supra.
209. See Rights of the Mentally Ill 504. The general shortage is exacerbated by
regional concentration. Half the nation's psychiatrists reside in five states; Wyoming,
in contrast, has but twelve in residence. Id.
210. This may well be an understatment. This estimate assumes that every psychiatrist is capable of undertaking the prediction of violence, that one hour is sufficient
time for that prediction, and that all psychiatrists would be free to work for the program. In reality, less than half of all psychiatrists are self-employed. Id. It seems
unlikely that paraprofessionals would be of much assistance; given the immense difficulty of violence prediction even by an experienced professional, the use of paraprofessionals would likely result in serious mistakes.
211. Id.
212. See Note, Firearms: Problems of Controls, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1328, 1337
(1967); 1967 Hearings 702-03 (statement of Alan Krug); id. at 1099 (statement of
G. McGovern). During one month in 1968, the number of firearms reported to federal
authorities as stolen rose by over 5,400. 1968 Hearings 766 (statement of B. Casey).
It has been estimated that there are up to a half-million owners of firearms in
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firearms from this source is neither unduly difficult nor costly. A
former Scotland Yard superintendant has stated that pistols can be purchased illegally for the equivalent of twelve dollars in London despite
the strict British controls.2 1 3 Here in the United States, New York
City police recently uncovered a case in which stolen firearms were
sold in a drug store "over the counter like bottles of aspirin.

' 214

It

therefore is likely that such illegal markets could be used to circumvent the effect of firearm controls.
In addition to illegal purchase of firearms, the construction of improvised firearms may pose serious problems for controls. Such
2 15
weapons, often known as "zip guns", are quickly and easily made.
These improvised firearms are both powerful and deadly. 18 In 1966
they were responsible for nearly one-tenth of New York City firearm
homicides. 2 " In areas with strict controls, mass production of zip
guns has become a profitable trade for those with special skills and
New York City, only 40,000 of which have applied for permits under its strict law.
Benenson, supra note 96, at 743. See also 1972 Hearings 181 (testimony of chief of
detectives Seedman). This, however, is not due solely to interstate evasion. Britain
has strict nationwide controls, and is isolated geographically from other nations, yet
in the three amnesty periods declared by British authorities since World War II, a total
of 186,000 illegally-owned firearms were turned into the government. 1967 Hearings
348 (testimony of Alexander Gomberg).
213. R. FABIAN, LONDON AFTER DARK 116 (1954).
See also 1971 Hearings at
250-251 (exhibit 31) ("[a] confirmed criminal . . . can and does buy whatever weapon
he wants with the greatest ease.")
214. N.Y. Times, July 26, 1968, § 1, at 1. It has been reported that it is possible
to lease illegal weapons from the Chicago underworld, in return either for a fixed fee
or a contingent fee arrangement. See 1967 Hearings 630 (statement of L. Jackson).
215. The construction of these weapons is often quite ingenious. Some persons
simply use sections of automobile radio antennae as barrels on frames made from cap
guns, filing the hammer so that it will operate as a firing pin; the result is a functioning, if crude, .22 caliber pistol. Others ream chambers in the larger airguns to accomodate rimfire cartridges, or modify blank-firing pistols. Those who seek weapons with
greater power often use firecrackers to drive loads of buckshot, fishing sinkers, or metal
scrap from barrels made of steel pipe. See Koffler, Zip Guns and Crude Conversions
-Identifying Characteristics and Problems (pts. 1-2), 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 520
(1969), 61 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 115 (1970); Smith, Zip Guns, POLICE, Jan.-Feb.
1963, at 10; DiMaio & Spitz, Variations in Wounding Due to Unusual Firearms and
Recently Available Ammunition, 17 J. FOR. Sc. 377 (1972); 1968 Hearings 471 (statement of J. Dingell); 1967 Hearings 593 (statement of B. Stanczyk).
216. Zip gun projectiles are fired from short, unrifled barrels and are often expanded by the muzzle blast; their instability causes them to tumble upon impact, inflicting serious tissue destruction. Koffler, Zip Guns and Crude Conversions-identifying Characteristicsand Problems, 61 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 115, 124 (1970).
The
larger firecracker models have been found capable of penetrating two inch planks and
45 gallon steel drums. Id. Canadian authorities have found such weapons to be able
to fire ball bearings through a 3/16 inch steel plate at fifty yards range. Koffler, Zip
Guns and Crude Conversions-Identifying Characteristicsand Problems, 60 J. CRiM.
L.C. & P.S. 520, 529 (1969).
217. 1968 Hearings 471-72 (statement of J. Dingell).
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equipment .2 18 Nor is zip gun use in control areas limited to juveniles.
One-half of the improvised firearms confiscated by New York City
police were found in the hands of adults.2 19 It seems unlikely that
controls will be able to significantly restrain markets in improvised

firearms. 2 °
Even where neither black-market guns nor improvised firearms
are available, other weapons may be employed as substitutes for firearms. Knife wounds frequently cause serious internal damage2 21 and
require but little strength to inflict. 222 The knife is inferior to the
firearm with respect to range, but since most encounters take place
at short distances2 23 this advantage may not 'be of great importance.
It is also possible to construct other stabbing weapons with greater
reach and power, such as pikes, bows or machetes. The experience
of past ages suggests that such weapons are quite capable of killing

an opponent. 24
Some authorities have argued that the probability of illegal pur218. H. KLEIN, THE POLICE: DAMNED IF THEY Do, DEMAND IF THEY DON'T 5859 (1968).
219. Koffler, Zip Guns and Crude Conversions-Identifying Characteristics and
Problems, 61 J. CIM. L.C. & P.S. 115, 125 (1970).
220. Some advocates of controls have suggested that regulation of ammunition
sales might limit the use of zip guns. See 1967 Hearings 953 (statement of W. Arrington). See also C. BAKAL, THE RIGHT To BEAR ARMS 17 (1966).
Ammunition controls would seem at best a doubtful remedy. Over 4.4 billion cartridges were produced
in this nation in 1967. NEWTON & ZIMRING 135-36. Cartridges cannot be assigned
serial numbers in light of their small size and the large numbers used. It therefore
becomes almost impossible to trace or limit the use of any particular lot of ammunition once it leaves the dealer's shelf. Moreover, the most powerful zip guns use firecrackers as propellant, rather than cartridges. See text and authorities cited note 215
supra.
221. See GLAIsER & RENToUL, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND TOXICOLOGY 273-74
(London, 1966); K. SIMPSON, FORENSIC MEDICINE 64 (London, 1964). But see Jordan, PancreaticInjuries, 3 TRAUMA 12 (1961).
222. C. POULSON, THE ESSENTIALS OF FORENSIC MEDICINE 110 (1965).
223. Wolfgang found that a majority of the homicides studied occurred within a
house. M. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 123, 130 (1958). A study
of cases where policemen were killed in New York over the past century has revealed
that the combat range in no case exceeded twenty-one feet, and in most cases was ten
feet or less. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 256 (1967).
224. For example, at Adrianople in 378 A.D., the Romans lost over 40,000 men
in a single day to Gothic forces using the bow and lance. J.F.C. FULLER, ARMAMENT
AND HISTORY 46 (1945).
Among cavalrymen, the debate over the advantages of the
saber and lance compared to the pistol continued well into this century. See B. VON
BERNHARDI, CAVALRY IN WAR AND PEACE
DENISON, A HISTORY OF CAVALRY 422-26

x-xv, 267 (U.S. Cavalry Assn. 1910); G.
(London, 1913). In Japan, where firearms

are rare, the past century has seen knife and sword assassinations of a minister of state,

a Prime Minister, and a general.
262, 322, 615 (1971).

See D.

BERGAMINI, JAPAN'S IMPERIAL CONSPIRACY
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chasing or improvising weapons is not great, since most murders are
crimes of passion, and the potential murderer's rage would cool by
the time he could obtain a weapon by these means.22 5 This response
contradicts the argument often used to justify federal, as opposed to
state, firearms regulations, the argument that present state controls are
circumvented by murderers traveling to other jurisdictions to purchase
and bring back firearms. 226 It would seem that if the time factor prevents a murderer from turning to an illegal outlet, it would also prevent him from traveling to another state, purchasing a firearm, and
returning to kill his victim.2 2 7 Moreover, the nature of murder does

not preclude the use of illegal channels of acquisition. A person who
becomes a murderer may well procure his weapon in advance of, and
for other purposes than, the homicide in which it is ultimately used. 2 8
There are essentially three motives for procuring a weapon; sporting
use, self protection, and criminal use. The last two are especially sig225. See 1967 Hearings 682 (testimony of Counsel Perian).
226. See R. CLARK, supra note 94, at 108; 1967 Hearings 877 (statement of J.
Tydings).
227. 1967 Hearings 421 (statement of F. Church). The inconsistency involved in
asserting that a time factor will prevent homicides under proposed national controls,
and that time is no barrier to murders under present state controls, occurs with regularity in debates over firearm controls. For example, when one witness was questioned concerning the rising homicide rate in New York, he replied: "The answer,
Senator, is the New York gun control law doesn't prevent people from going down to
Mississippi and buying guns and taking them to New York." 1971 Hearings 235
(statement of A. Mikva). A short time later the same witness testified that "without
the glut of handguns, people would not find it so easy, so convenient, or so tempting
to kill other people." Id. at 238. Senator Tydings has suggested that the majority of
gun murders involve "some sort of a situation where there was no premeditation, where
it was a spur of the moment thing . . . and if there hadn't been a gun available a
great many of those people would have been alive today." 1967 Hearings 877, and yet
argues that "out of state sources provide a substantial number of guns to those who
commit crime." 1968 Hearings 24-25. Clark has stated, in defense of controls, that
"the criminal mind is rarely so logical. When guns are available, they are used. If
guns are not at hand, the criminal will not find them" and also that "[m]ail order
weapons were regularily delivered into dangerous hands" and "we are far too mobile
and interdependent to rely on a network of state and local laws." R. CLARK, supra
note 94, at 108, 112, 113 (1970).
228. A study of persons using firearms to commit various crimes, conducted by
Donald Newman, is instructive. Newman found that, of the three gun murderers surveyed, two had owned the firearm used in the killing for six months to a year prior
to the homicide. Of the nine who used firearms in aggravated assaults, six had bought
what they thought were stolen guns, one made his own burglary to obtain the weapon,
and the remaining two were too vague concerning the source of the weapon for any
determination to be made. Of the 13 armed robbers who used firearms, half had had
the weapon for one to two weeks prior to the robbery; five bought guns "on the street",
four obtained them from burglaries; of the remaining subjects, one used a toy gun, one
used a firearm obtained in a strongarm robbery, one borrowed weapons from unsuspecting friends, one used his wife's firearm. Only one purchased his gun from a licensed
dealer. It failed to fire. See NEWTON & ZIMRING 183-85.
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nificant in urban areas.229 Persons who are planning a crime, or who
fear crime and desire protection, will procure or construct weapons
and keep them at home. These weapons will be at hand should they
later enter a homicidal rage. It therefore seems likely that the interposition of a period of time between the desire for a weapon and the
obtaining of it would not substantially reduce homicides and, accordingly, murderers would continue to have a wide selection of extralegal
means to obtain weapons. It is likely that the effect of firearms control would be impaired by the illegal purchase of guns, the construction of improvised firearms, and the use of substitute weapons such
as knives.
The possibility that controls would be evaded through the use of
substitute weapons has been the subject of two recent statistical
studies, one by Seitz and the other by Zimring. The Seitz study23 °
centers on comparing the relation between state gun homicides and
total homicides. Seitz argues that if murderers in gun control states
merely substitute other weapons with equally lethal effect there should
be no necessary relationship from state to state between the rates of
murders with firearms and the total murder rate. Seitz then, on the
basis of his scatter diagram, concludes that there is a strong relationship between gun homicide and total homicide rates. On the strength
of this relationship, he concludes that substitution of other weapons
for guns does not occur and that gun control is therefore likely to reduce homicide rates.
Assuming that Seitz is correct in finding a correlation between
gun and total homicides in each state, the question focuses on the extrapolations that may be made from this finding. Upon closer analysis, the correlation does not prove, as Seitz contends, that the substitution theory is invalid. It does establish (contrary to his conclusion
that murders are determined by prevailing firearms regulations) that
there is a common determinant of firearm and non-firearm homicide
rates. His study does not prove the substitution theory invalid, for
it assumes what must be proven: present controls have restricted firearms availability and thereby made substitution necessary. To the extent that future murderers cannot be predicted, they can obtain guns
legally under existing controls. To the extent that they have access
229. NEWTON &

ZIMRING

21, 61.

230. Seitz, supra note 163, at 595. The discussion of the substitution theory occupies the first half of Seitz's study. The second portion, a statistical analysis of present
homicide rates in controlling and noncontrolling states, is discussed in the text following note 163 supra.
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to illegal markets, they can obtain illegal guns. These two factors
make it likely that a lack of substitution of non-firearms would not
be due to the impossibility of substitution, but rather to -the ease of
obtaining legal or illegal firearms despite control measures. In addition to failing to refute the substitution hypothesis, Seitz's correlations
prove that controls are not a major determinant of homicide rates.
Controls can reduce overall rates only by reducing that part of 'the
total rate brought about with guns, for gun controls must leave the
non-gun portion of the total rate untouched.2 3 ' Since gun homicides
are only a part of the total homicide rate,2" 2 a reduction in gun homi3
cides will lower the firearm rate more than it lowers the total rate.Therefore, if existing control systems have a significant impact on the
homicide rate, those states with controls would diverge significantly
from the general ratio of gun to total homicide rates. But Seitz finds
"there is an astonishing .98 correlation between -the firearm homicide
rate and the total homicide rate based on aggregate data for the fifty
states."2'34 This strong relationship would be consistent with the hypothesis that gun controls are not determinants of the homicide rate;
whatever determines the overall homicide rate affects both gun and
non-gun homicides to the same degree, maintaining them in exact proportion, something which cannot be done by firearm controls.3 5 Thus
it would seem that Seitz's study undercuts his own conclusions. It
does not establish -that the substitution hypothesis is untenable, but it
does demonstrate -that the predominant determinant of homicide rates
is not the amount of control exerted over firearms.
A more elaborate attempt to apply statistical techniques to the
question of whether firearms could be replaced by other weapons of
equal deadlines was made 'by Frank Zimring.2 36 Zimring's study begins
with a general analysis of Chicago homicides during the years 1965
to 1967, from which he concludes that most homicides are not the
product of a single-minded determination to kill, but rather spring
from an ambiguous intent to inflict some manner of injury on
231. See text accompanying notes 131-133 supra.
232. Approximately three out of eight murders are committed with weapons other
than guns. Benenson, supra note 96, at 720.
233. An example may clarify this point. Assume that a given state has 100 murders, 50 with firearms and 50 without. If controls reduced the gun homicide rate by

50%, gun homicides would drop from 50 to 25 and total homicides would drop from
100 to 75.

The ratio of gun homicides to total homicides would be significantly al-

tered from 50:100, or one in two, to 25:75, or one in three.
234. Seitz, supra note 163, at 596.
235. See text accompanying notes 131-133 supra.
236. Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U. CHI L.

REv.721 (1968).
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an opponent.23 7 Zimring then moves to a more detailed analysis of
knife and gun attacks over a two month period in Chicago. From
this analysis, he concludes that knife attacks stem from the same
motives as do gun attacks. He argues that, since knife assaults outnumber gun assaults by 2.3 to 1, and knife homicides amounted to
only half the number of gun homicides, an attack with a gun is about
five times as likely to kill as an attack with a knife. 3 8
The Zimring study is impressive and has been treated as though
applicable nationwide,2" 9 despite its being a limited two-month survey
of one city. A closer examination of Zimring's conclusions in light of
nationwide data reveals, however, that his conclusions regarding intent
and deadliness are subject to question. First, there is substantial reason to question his conclusion that murder usually results from an
ambiguous intent to injure. To support this conclusion, Zimring cites
three categories of proof: indicators that murder is a crime of passion-victim and offender are often friends, the motive is a quarrel, the
offender often had been drinking; indicators that the killer did not do
all in his power to kill the victim-usually only one shot was
fired; and indicators that homicides -and assaults are products of
the same type of situations-the victims of each have similarities.
None of these arguments seem to establish clearly that homicide
is ambiguously motivated. It appears that a person who seizes
a gun and fires it into another person intended to do more than
merely injure that person, whether his victim be a friend or an enemy
and whether his intent to kill grew out of drunken rage or sober premeditation. An offender who uses a weapon has his fists for use as
well. The choice of a deadly weapon over an appendage likely to
injure but not kill creates at least an inference of intent to achieve
something more than the infliction of bruises. Zimring's second argument, that only 30% of gun murderers shot their victim more than
once, tends to strengthen rather than weaken this inference of intent
to kill. Since all gun murders, by definition, resulted in the death
of the victim, it seems likely that the 70% who fired only once were
satisfied with inflicting the single fatal wound. 240 That nearly onethird of the gun murderers thought it advisable to administer a coup237. Id. at 722-24.

238. Id. at 728.
239. See Zimring, Firearms Control, Hard Choices, 8 TRIAL Jan.-Feb. 1972, at 53
(1972); Seitz, supra note 163, at 598; NEWTON & ZIMIUN 45. See also 1969 Hearings

104-06 (statement of National Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence);
id. at 154 (statement of G. Newton).

240. It is also possible that their aim was terrible, and they were fortunate enough
to hit their victim once. See authority cited note 281 infra.
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de-grace to a wounded victim suggests strongly that homicides may
be the product of a clear intent to kill. Zimring's third argument, that
victims of assault and homicide are similar in terms of race and sex
also does little to establish that the difference between a homicide and
an assault is a matter of chance. It seems equally probable that these
similarities reflect the distribution of crime in general, and violent
crime in particular, among the population, rather than establishing any
unique relationship between homicide and assault.2 4 ' Zimring's own
evidence therefore does not establish that homicide is the product of
an ambiguous intent to injure.
Zimring's conclusion of an ambiguous intent is further weakened
by other studies which have found significant differences between
participants in assaults and homicides. An extensive study of violent
crime in seventeen major cities found male offenders and female victims were present in 17.5% of the murders, compared to 27% of the
assaults; women were the victims in 21% of the murders, as against
34% of assaults.24 2 Locational variations were also present: 37% of
the murders occurred outdoors, compared to 52% of assaults; the street
was the location of 25% of the killings versus 39% of -theassaults, while
10% of the killings and only 3% of the assaults occurred in the bedroom.2 4 3 This study also found significant age differentials: offenders
of age 17 or less committed 9% of the killings, as against 18% of the
assaults. 24 4 Another study found significant racial differences between
women convicted of homicide and those convicted of assault. 245 Homicide offenders and assault offenders thus appear to differ in several
material aspects tending to indicate that homicide and assault are not
241. For example, nationwide figures for the years 1970-1972 disclose surprising
similarity between persons arrested for murder and those arrested for larceny. The
average age of the murderer was 29; that of the larceny offender was 28. Average
ages at first arrest were 23 and 24. 21% of murderers and 27% of thieves had one
one prior arrest; 8% of each had two prior arrests; 4% of each had three. 58% of the

murders and 59% of the thieves had been arrested in one other state.

1972 UCR

38, table A. Despite these similarities, there are few who would maintain that murder and larceny are but two sides of the same coin, that thieves are unsuccessful murderers or vice versa. The two would seem to coincide simply because the same social
groups make up both categories of offenders, not because of any inherent connection
between the offenses, and the same might well be true of similarities between homicide

and assault. Mere similarity of offenders does not, alone, establish that the offenses
are motivated by the same intent.
242. MULVIHML & TUMIN, CRIMES OF VIOLENCE 210-11 (1969) (Staff Reports to
the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, vol. 11).
243. Id. at 221.
244. Id. at 210-I1.

245. See Ward, Crimes of Violence by Women,

CRIMES OF VIOLENCE

903-04

(1969) (Staff Reports to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence, vol. 13).
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necessarily different products of the same motivation acting upon the
same offenders. To the extent that persons who commit homicide are
not the same type of persons who commit assault, a comparison of assault
with murder does not give a true indication of how often attacks result
in homicides and how often ithey do not. To this extent Zimring's
comparisons cannot be used to conclude that one weapon is more likely
to kill than another.
Zimring's premise that a lower "success rate" among knife attacks
establishes that the knife is less deadly as a weapon than is the
firearm is subject to question on a different basis. Several studies of
homicide have suggested that those persons who attack with a knife
may, as a group, have different characteristics and be motivated by
different motives than those who attack with a firearm. If the two
sets of weapons-users are not identical, then a comparison between
their "success rates" may indicate little about the dealiness of the weapons employed. A recent California study has determined that killers
who chose to use firearms were more likely than knife murderers to
be found guilty of premeditated murder,24 which may infer that gun
killers as a group are more likely to act pursuant to plans laid in advance. 247 Significant racial differences -in choice of weapons were
found by Wolfgang in his Philadelphia study,2 48 a finding seconded by
a more recent observer. 24 9 To the extent that a firearm is disproportionately used by groups whose members are more likely to premediate their killings,2 5 and to the extent that a premediated murder is
more likely to succeed than an unplanned attempt, comparisons between firearm and knife attacks are subject to external bias. Significant sexual differences have also been noted in homicide, with women
resorting to knives more often and to guns less often than men. 251 To
the extent that a woman is less likely to succeed in hand-to-hand com246. See I. RAMSEIER, WILFUL HOMICIDE IN CALIFORNIA 1963-65, 44 (Calif. Dep't
of Justice 1967). Ramseier found that gun killers were twice as likely to be convicted
of murder in the first degree as were knife murderers (16.7% versus 8.3%). In contrast, 45.6% of the knife killers and 35.8% of the gun killers were convicted of manslaughter.
247. It is also possible that juries perceived the gun killings as more serious crimes
and allowed this to affect their assessment of premeditation. Whether this can explain

conviction rates differing by a factor of two, where both forms of attack are known
by the juries to have resulted in the victim's death, is open to debate.
248. M. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 85-86 (1958).

249. See C.

O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

524-25 (1970).

250. Id.; Benenson, supra note 96, at 728. See also M. WOLFGANG, CRIMES OF
(report to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
VIOLENCE 168 (1967)
the Administration of Justice).
251. See S. PALMER, A STUDY OF MURDER 23 (1960); C. O'HARA, supra note 249,
at 524-25; J. MAcDoNALD, THE MURDERER AND HIS VICTIM 34 (1961).
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bat,25 the knife homicide-ratio may not reflect its true deadliness
were both sexes to utilize it fully. Finally, Wolfgang's study found
significant disparities in alcohol consumption prior to the fatal attack,
determining that both parties were completely sober in five out of ten
gun homicides and only three out of ten killings with other weapons.2 s
The greater tendency of gun murderers to act while sober may indicate that gun killings are less likely to be the products of sudden passion, and may also indicate a lessened coordination and weakened offensive capacity among users of other weapons.2 54 It would appear
that gun attackers differ from attackers who use other weapons, and
that comparisons ,between the two may reflect factors other than the
relative deadliness of the weapons involved.
The evidence which Zimring presents to suggest similarities between knife and gun attacks does not establish that both forms of attack can properly be compared. It does not seem likely, as Zimring
appears to suggest, that virtually all the reported knife assaults were
committed with the same intent as that behind homicides. Zimring's
measure of unsuccessful attacks appears to be aggravated assaults as
reported to the Chicago police. 255 Under Illinois law, that offense encompasses any assault with a deadly weapon, regardless of intent or
outcome.2 5
Zimring produces no evidence to demonstrate that any
significant number of knife attacks that were not intended to kill were
unreported and thus screened out of his figures. In view of the
breadth of the statute and the probability that a person subjected even
to a threat of attack with a deadly weapon would report the occurence,
such underreporting does not seem likely to be significant. Zimring
also argues that knife and gun assaults occur in the same sort of dis252. See M. WOLFGANG, supra note 248, at 163.
253. Bacon, Alcohol, Alcoholism and Crime, in CRIME IN AMERICA 208 (B.
Cohen ed. 1970).
254. Id.
255. Zimring is vague concerning what measures were employed to determine at-

tacks. His only reference is to "serious attacks", but no evidence is given of any
screening system used to eliminate attacks not in earnest. There are several factors
suggesting that aggravated assaults, as reported by the police, were employed. The
overall Chicago study involved over 26,000 attacks. Zimring, supra note 236, at 728.
The sheer mass of these reports would probably preclude any sifting of the facts of

individual police reports.

Further, no mention is made of any screening system; in

attempting to deny the likelihood that many non-earnest attacks were involved, Zimring

only notes that the police may have screened out some such attacks by not reporting
them as criminal incidents.

Id. at 729.

Finally, when the Chicago study was para-

phrased for a staff report to a presidential commission, the attacks employed in the
computations were labelled "total attacks" rather than "serious attacks." See NEWTON
& ZIMRTNG 41.
256. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-2(a)(1) (1973).
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putes,25 7 but this does not prove that those who attack in those circumstances with a specific intent to kill are as likely to choose a knife

as a gun. He also suggests that the racial distribution of knife and
gun assaults is about the same, a result which has been contradicted
'by other studies2 5 and which ignores at least one substantial difference
found in his own study.259 Zimring lastly notes that the distribution
of wounds on the anatomy of the victim is about the same in attacks

with guns as in attacks with knives.

The assumption that the location

of a wound is an indicator of the attack's intended deadliness ignores

the fact that the location of a particular wound may be largely a product of chance. 6 The attacker, whether intending to kill or merely
to injure, is likely to miss the area for which he was aiming. The
tendency of non-fatal wounds to involve only one hit may not indicate
that the attacker did not follow up his attack; it may well be accounted
for by the poor marksmanship of the offender,2 6 ' or by the attempts
of intended victims to flee. 262 Thus it seems that knife and firearm
attackers differ significantly in several respects, and that a comparison
of the homicide-ratios of the two does not indicate the deadliness of

the weapons involved.
A third reason for questioning the results of the Zimring study

is that an examination of nationwide figures indicates that the ratio
of murders to assaults may not be an accurate indicator of the dead257. Zimring, supra note 236, at 727. It should be noted, however, that Zimring's
table discloses certain distinctions between homicides committed by shooting and by
stabbing. 21% of the shootings, as against 25% of the stabbings, grew out of general
domestic disputes; 41% of the shootings, compared to 30% of the stabbings, did not
fit into any of the listed categories and were classified under "other" disputes.
258. See authorites cited notes 248, 249 supra.
259. According to Zimring's data, among men, 16% of white murderers, compared
to 21% of black murderers, used knives. Among women, the disparity jumped to 55%
versus 33%. Zimring, supra note 236, at 727, Table 5.
260. A study conducted after World War II by James Hopkins may illuminate this
issue. This study concerned the anatomic distribution of wounds inflicted on U.S. servicemen by enemy forces during the fighting in New Georgia and Burma. Of the 91
rifle wounds examined, 44 were inflicted on an arm or a leg rather than the trunk
of the body. Hopkins, Casualty Survey-New Georgia and Burma Campaigns in
WOUND BALLIsTIcs 261-62, table 39 (U.S. Army Medical Dept. 1962). It would seem
that the difficulty of hitting another person, even with a rifle, when that person is doing his best to avoid being hit is such that the location of wounds inflicted is largely
a matter of chance. That nearly half the wounds were found on the extremities hardly
indicates that the enemy armed forces were lacking in lethal intent.
261. See authorities cited note 281 inIra.
262. Many pistols in common use today are of relatively low power. A person
struck by one of these, if he is not killed outright, may be able to flee or even to
subdue his attacker despite the serious character of his wound. See Bristow, Which
Cartridge for Police, 53 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 249 (1962); M. JossERAND & J. STEVENSON, PISTOLS, REVOLVERS AND AmmUNTON 154-55 (1972).
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liness of attacks. Zimring argues that homicides and assaults flow from
the same motives and that therefore a high ratio of murders to 'assaults
indicates the use of a more deadly means of attack. An application
of this theory to the nation at large produces some curious results.
The murder-assault ratio for the western states is 1:29, almost 50%
below the nationwide average ratio of 1:18.263 Yet the western states
have the second highest regional rate of gun ownership and the highest
rate of pistol ownership in the nation.2 64 Apparently, either extensive
gun ownership does not increase the deadliness of attacks, or else the
murder-assault ratio is not a proper indicator of this deadliness. An
examination of state crime figures also shows several states with a very
low murder-assault ratio, but which are known neither for anti-gun
traditions nor for stringent control laws. 65 Indeed, of the ten states
with the lowest "kill-ratios" only two, Rhode Island and Massachusetts,
are generally considered strong gun-law states.2 66 There are also several states which are similar in location, cultural factors, and lack of
firearm controls, yet which show massive disparities in homicide-assault ratios. 2 7 Further, these ratios may vary dramatically from year
to year within the same state, despite a lack of apparent change in
firearms regulations.268 It seems unlikely that the actual deadliness
of attacks varies to this degree from year to year or from state to state;
accordingly, it is probable that murder-assault ratios do not properly
register variations in deadliness. Finally, the application of this approach to nationwide figures in the long term produces some unusual
conclusions. It is clear that the possession of firearms, 269 as well as
firearm use in homicide, 270 has been increasing. Yet the nationwide
263. These figures have been computed from data contained in 1972 UCR, table

3.
264. NEWTON &

ZTMRING 10.
265. For example, Arizona at 1:39, Montana at 1:41 and Utah at 1:34, all of
which have much lower "kill-ratios" than such control states as New York (1:22),
New Jersey (1:21) or Pennsylvania (1: 17). See 1972 UCR, table 5.
266. The ten lowest states are Rhode Island (1:118), South Dakota (1:71), Vermont (1:42), Montanta (1:41), Arizona (1:39), Nebraska (1:36), Delaware (1:34),
Utah (1:34) and Connecticut (1:33). See id. The unusually low rate of Rhode Island

marks a sudden jump in the rates: in 1970 its ratio was 1:38, in 1971, 1:42. See
1970, 1971 UCR.
267. For example, North and South Carolina show ratios of 1:25 and 1:17, differing by one-third; North and South Dakota stand at 1:24 and 1:71, a difference of
nearly 300%. See 1972 UCR, table 5.
268. Between 1970 and 1971, Arizona went from 1:22 to 1:37, South Dakota
moved from 1:16, above the national average, to 1:56, the lowest in the nation, while
North Dakota rose from 1:43 to 1:20, and Oregon jumped from 1:28 to 1:49. See
1970, 1971 UCR.
269. NEWTON & ZIMRING xi. See also R. CLARK, supra note 94, at 103.
270. See NEWTON & ZIMRrNG Xii.
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murder-assault ratio has gone from 1:7 in 1933 to 1:20 in 1963,27
falling by a factor of three. Either increased firearms ownership and
use in crime does not increase the deadliness of attacks, or else the
ratio employed by Zimring is an inaccurate indicator of deadliness.
Either possibility renders questionable the application of the Zimring
approach ,to the advisability of future firearms legislation. Neither the
Zimring nor the Seitz studies dispel the possibility hat those with homicidal intent would still accomplish their ends by other means under
a system of controls, nor can they establish that the control administrators would be able -to divert firearms from those with homicidal tendencies. In view of the difficulty of predicting future killers, in light
of the probability that such killers would be able to obtain in advance
illegal firearms or other weapons with which to effectuate their intent,
it is probable that additional firearms regulations will encounter serious
difficulties in attempting to reduce homicide rates.
In summary, the advisability of further firearms legislation at the
federal level is subject to serious question. The experience of jurisdictions that have adopted firearm controls does not seem to indicate
that such controls have materially reduced the homicide rate. Comparisons by means of statistical tools likewise have been unable to
demonstrate that controls have been significant determinants of the
homicide rate. Additional legislation does not appear to hold much
prospect for restraining future homicide rates. The absense of a practical, accurate and fair test to determine future homicidal tendencies,
as well as the difficulties posed by illegal markets, improvised firearms,
and substitute weapons suggest that such legislation would have a vety
limited impact.
EVALUATION OF CURRENT PROPOSALS

The focus of proposed federal firearm legislation has shifted substantially over the past five years. The proposals advanced following
the civil disorders of the 1967 - 1968 period were oriented toward
both handguns and long arms.27 2 These proposals sought to register
2 73
the firearms and prohibit ownership by certain groups of individuals.
271. Glasser, Kenefich & O'Leary, The Violent Offender, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN
(1968).
272. See S. 3691, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); 18 U.S.C. § 921-928 (1970).
273. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1970); HAwAI REV. STAT. § 134-7 (Supp.
1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-3(d), 24-3.1(a)(3) (1973); MICH. ANN. STAT.
tit. 28, § 28.92 (Supp. 1973). Some of the categories most frequently employed bear
THE STUDY OF CRIME 109

little relation to violent tendencies. The 1968 federal act included several unusual
categories, such as users of marijuana and those given dishonorable military discharges.
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During the 1970's, however, -the trend has been toward controls narrower in scope but more restrictive in application. The emphasis has
been primarily on handguns, and the proposed restrictions have ranged
from a prohibition on future sales27 4 to a complete ban on private
2 75
ownership.
Proposals for a complete ban on pistol ownership avoid the difficulty of predicting future offenders, since all private possession of the
weapon in question is made illegal. They do not, however, avoid the
difficulties involved in preventing illegal sales, substitute weapons and
improvised firearms. 276 In addition, handgun controls encounter a
unique problem, the danger of substitution of long arms for handguns
in homicide. It appears likely that many murderers who now employ
handguns would find long arms of equal utility. The handgun has
two major advantages over the rifle as an agent of homicide. The
pistol is concealable and it is easier to bring it to bear on a target
at very close range. The advantage of concealability may be greatly
overestimated. Around 34% of homicides occur in the home,277
where the ability to transport the weapon to the scene of the crime
is unimportant. Another 37% occur outdoors 278 where the ranges are
likely to be longer and the very limited effective range of the handgun is a severe handicap.2 79 This leaves only 26% of homicides, those
which occur outside the home but indoors,28 0 where the pistol is likely
to prove more useful to a murderer than a long arm.
The second advantage of the pistol, the ease with which it can
be brought to bear on nearby targets, also seems to be of questionable
significance. At very close ranges, a knife attack could probably be
executed as easily as a pistol shot. At anything beyond the closest
ranges, inexperienced shooters are likely ,to miss their victim entirely
18 U.S.C. § 922 (1970).

The latter prohibition has been upheld against a challenge

on bill of attainder grounds. See United States v. Karnes, 437 F.2d 284 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied 402 U.S. 1008 (1971), noted in 26 RuTGERs L. REV. 141 (1972).
See generally Note, Firearms: Problems of Controls, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1328, 1333-38

(1967).
274. See H.R. 5063, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973); H.R. 2582, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.

(1972).
275. See H.R. 15875, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1972).
276. The problem of improvised weapons may have even greater effect on this
form of statute. .22 caliber rifles could be purchased legally and then converted into
impromptu pistols by shortening the barrel and the stock. See Smith, Unusual Handguns, 6 J. FOR. Sci. 501 (1961); Smith, Zip Guns, POLICE Jan.-Feb. 1963, at 12.

277. MULVIHILL & Tuam4N, supra note 242, at 221.
278. Id.
279. See authorities cited note 281 infra.

280. MULVlHILL & TuMrn, supra note 242, at 221. (Percentages do not add to
100% since the location of the homicide could not be determined in 2.5% of the
cases).
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with a pistol.281
Were murderers forced to rely upon long arms rather -than pistols,
these factors might nonetheless cause a limited reduction in the number of occasions upon which an attacker is able to inflict a gunshot
wound. This reduction in the infliction of wounds might well be offset by the increased probability that the wounds inflicted would result
in death. Data from military studies indicate that rifle projectiles inflict more severe injuries and are more likely to kill than even the
largest pistol projectiles, due to the greater velocity and energy of the
rifle projectile.28 ' Approximately half of present handgun murders involve very small caliber weapons,28 3 which have a fatality rate less
than half that of the larger pistols.2 84 It therefore seems probable

that a shift from handguns to longer weapons would involve a substantial increase in the fatality rate for firearm wounds, which would be
likely to offset any effects of a reduction in attacks. Prohibition of

pistol ownership is thus not likely to affect homicide rates materially,
even assuming that the controls managed to prevent illegal acquisition
of handguns.28 5
281. See T. WHEELER, MISTER RIFLEMAN 139 (1965); Guns on Capitol Hill, THE
NATION, June 24, 1968, at 13. Colonel Wheeler describes as typical the performance
of one inexperienced pistol shooter who missed completely a four by six foot target
fifty times out of fifty shots at a range of only fifteen yards.
282. See French and Callender, Ballistic Characteristics of Wounding Agents in
WOUND BALLISTICS 94-95 (U.S. Army Medical Dept. 1962). This study found that
with handguns "the comparatively low velocities produced minimal wounds" while rifles inflicted "at combat ranges, comparatively severe wounds . . . much more so than
with the usual sidearms missile and velocity." Id. They concluded that even the massive ".45 caliber bullet is of little value as a wound producing agent. The bullet often
fails either to penetrate or to fracture bone and practically never shatters bone in the
manner common to the rifle bullet." ld. at 140.
French and Callender found that the amount of tissue destruction caused by a bullet was directly proportional to its kinetic energy at impact. Id. at 133. The .30-06,
a standard sporting rifle, fires a projectile with a muzzle energy of 2,440 foot-pounds,
over twenty times as much energy as the .22 long rifle, which is often used in pistol
homicides. See J. AMBER, GUN DIGEST 346-47 (1971); authorities cited note 262
supra.
283. See 1971 Hearings 29 (testimony of B. Bayh) (43% of handgun homicides involve .22 or .25 weapons); Zimring, The Medium is the Message, 1 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 97, 102 (1972).
284. Zimring, supra note 283, at 103 (single wounds: .22 fatal in 36% of shootings,
.38 in 83%; multiple wounds: 36% versus 100%, respectively).
285. During the 1960's, when the controls being urged applied to handguns and
long arms alike, many of the advocates of such control argued that pistol controls alone
would achieve little. See NEWTON & ZIMRING 106-107; 1967 Hearings 674-75 (statement of R. Perian); id. at 1017-18 (statement of R. Hughes); 1968 Hearings 43 (statement of H. Fong); 1969 Hearings 161 (statement of T. Dodd). For a rather vitrolic
dialogue between Sen. Thomas Dodd, arguing for moderately strict controls on all firearms, and Frank Zimring, supporting complete abolition of pistol ownership alone,
1969 Hearings 161-64.
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A proposal of still more limited effect has been directed at limiting the trade in "Saturday Night Specials," which are cheap, poorly
constructed handguns.28 6 This legislation would ban the manufacture

of handguns constructed from zinc castings or other metal which melts
at less than 800 degrees Fahrenheit. Since more costly weapons could
still be manufactured, this proposal could easily be circumvented, but
at least it would have the effect of removing from the market certain
shoddy weapons of no legitimate value.28 1 This approach may point
the way to legislation which could establish suitable quality standards
for firearms, a measure which could eliminate useless guns while improving the quality and desirability of the firearm market. A simple
proof test, such as requiring a firearm to withstand a 50% pressure
overload, would not screen out weapons now used by sportsmen but
would stop a great many guns constructed from zinc and pot metal.
Requirements of reasonable but close tolerances in working parts
would do much to end markets for "Saturday Night Specials" but
would not hinder production of quality firearms. Such requirements
must, however, be fixed with an eye to the nature and limitations of
the particular type of firearm involved.288
Perhaps the best approach is that taken by the framers of the
1968 Act,28 9 limiting the federal standards to prevention of interstate
286. See H.R. 3611, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 4218, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 24-3 (1973).
See generally Note, Gun ControlRecent Legislative Developments, 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 535 (1973). The term "Saturday
Night Special" has also been applied to all handguns with short barrels, some of
which are of high quality and cost. As used here, it refers only to the very cheap
firearms of poor construction, not to the expensive firearms of good quality put out
by reputable manufacturers.
287. A quality handgun can have several legitimate uses, including formal and informal target shooting, hunting, and self-defense. Handgun hunting is becoming more
popular with time, and the recent introduction of birdshot loads for pistols makes handguns suitable for snake protection for hikers, as well as proper for a lightweight survival weapon. A cheap pistol of loose tolerances and weak structure is useless for
these purposes.
288. For instance, it might seem reasonable to impose a requirement that a pistol
not fire if dropped on its hammer. Certain forms of handguns, such as single-action
revolvers, have a mechanism which makes it difficult to prevent such a blow from firing the gun. Persons who prefer the single-action-and many do-simply carry only
five rounds in the cylinder, leaving an empty chamber under the hammer. This precaution is quite practical with the single-action and renders it entirely safe. The application of this particular requirement to this particular form of handgun would therefore
be improper. In the same way, pressure tests for automatic pistols should not be set
so high as those for revolvers, since automatics require a mechanism which is more
vulnerable to overloads. Application of minimum size and weight limitations to imported pistols under the 1968 Act has led to some rather gross distortions of high-quality pistols manufactured in Europe in an attempt to retain the American market, without stopping the domestic production of cheap, low quality firearms. See M. JosSERAND & J. STEVESON, supra note 262, at 308-318.
289. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1970).
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evasion of existing state laws. It should be obvious that the desirability of firearms legislation varies from state to state, as does its
disadvantages; there seems to be no logical reason for imposing standards suitable for New York City upon such areas as Wyoming
and Utah. With interstate evasion prevented, the population of each
state may balance the competing interests involved in firearms legislation and determine what form of control, or noncontrol, is best for
their particular situation. No justification, other than prevention of
evasion, has ever been given for the imposition of a single, nationwide
standard. In view of the diversity of homicide rates, urbanization, and
opportunities for legitimate gun use, it seems doubtful that such a justification is possible.
CONCLUSION

Should additional firearm controls be enacted at the federal level,
it seems likely that they will be considered constiutional. Such a view,
however suited to present needs, seems to contravene the intent of
the framers and what would appear to be the better interpretation of
the words of the second amendment. The approach intended by the
framers appears to be oriented toward denying the national government all power to limit the ownership of arms by the citizenry, the
motive for this limitation being both to enable the states to draw from
the pool of armed citizens and also to enable the citizens to better
deter possible government oppression. Both the framer's apparent intent and these motives are inconsistent with the existence of any national power to disarm individual citizens, whether or or not they have
become members of an organized military unit. The accepted interpretations of the second amendment thus turn upon distinctions not
intended by the framers and create a grant of power which the framers
sought specifically to negate.
The imposition of nationwide firearm controls would not have a
significant impact upon homicide rates. The experience of existing
controls, whether assessed by simple comparisons or by elaborate statistical tools, does not indicate that existing controls have had a measurable influence upon homicide rates. Additional controls would face
serious impediments due to the difficulty of predicting future killers,
illegal firearm markets, improvised firearms and substitute weapons.
These impediments, complicated by the mass of firearms involved,
form significant barriers to the effectiveness of any system of firearm
controls.
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